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Abstract 
 
 
The concentration of the population and socioeconomic activities in the 
Metropolitan Area of Port au Prince (MAPAP) in Haiti has a negative impact within 
MAPAP and on the socioeconomic development of the entire country. This 
phenomenon, known as urban primacy, is increasing at an unprecedented rate in 
developing countries. Urban primacy in the Third World is explained by scholars 
studying the phenomenon and by dependency theorists. Economic decentralization, 
based on growth pole theory, is one of the most frequently used policies for slowing the 
growth of primate cities by focusing on development poles. In Haiti, the potential growth 
poles are the regional capitals that have a constitutional mandate to promote and 
manage the development of their region. 
I have tested some of the assumptions of dependency and growth pole theories 
on Haiti, using the eight regional capitals as units of analysis. Using migration, 
geographic, and socioeconomic data, I have identified the strongest poles and 
explained their attraction power and formulated policy recommendations that will 
increase the chances of successfully implementing economic decentralization. The 
research design is the case study.  
The data show that MAPAP overshadows the regional capitals at the national 
level and within the capitals’ own region, except for Cap Haïtien. However, the regional 
capitals are the primary destinations for migrants within their regions. The strongest 
poles are Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, and Port de Paix. Their attraction power is explained 
primarily by their population size and by their connections to the international market.  
Due to the selection criteria of the units of analysis and the limitations of the data 
used, the support and rejection of the growth pole and dependency theories hypotheses 
are not conclusive for the testing of these theories in Haiti or the Third World. 
The Haitian government needs to be more aggressive in addressing the 
consequences of urban primacy by implementing a comprehensive economic 
decentralization. The January 12, 2010, earthquake brought light on the issues raised 
viii 
 
by this study. Fortunately, the Haitian government has expressed its vision for the 
rebuilding of Haiti with an emphasis on decentralizing socioeconomic 
activities outside of MAPAP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Haiti, regional development, decentralization, growth pole theory, 
dependency theory, secondary cities, migration 
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Introduction 
I am from Jacmel, Haiti. I decided at a young age to find a field of study and a profession 
that would give me the skills to make a difference and contribute to the socioeconomic development 
of my country. International development and urban studies are interdisciplinary fields that seek to 
understand issues facing the developing world, attempt to overcome them, and understand the 
progress made in developing countries like Haiti. I chose the field of geography and land 
management. After earning my master’s degree in France, I returned to Haiti but could not, 
unfortunately, find work in my field in Jacmel. Most of my high school classmates were in the same 
situation. I started working in land management, decentralization, geographic information systems 
(GIS), and urban development for international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and 
other public institutions in Haiti’s capital city, Port au Prince. In the Metropolitan Area of Port au 
Prince (MAPAP), I was struck by the omnipresence of shantytowns, the constant road congestion, 
the inability of the governing institutions to provide basic urban services such as water and 
sanitation, and the lack of security. Jacmel felt like paradise compared to MAPAP.   
The present study reflects my personal interests, my educational background, and my 
professional experience. I wanted to understand why a once vibrant city like Jacmel could no longer 
retain its population, even when members of that population are trained professionals with skills 
that are valuable to the city. I have found some answers during my professional experience 
elaborating regional and urban development plans and by participating in the debate about effective 
decentralization in Haiti: Jacmel cannot retain its natives because there are no jobs in the city. There 
is no serious institution of higher education in the city; residents of Jacmel must move to Port au 
Prince to further their education. Due to the lack of good health care facilities in Jacmel, parents and 
families must often move to Port au Prince if a relative has a chronic illness. These are just a few 
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examples of the circumstances that cause people to leave Jacmel. These issues affect all the cities of 
the country outside MAPAP. A disproportionate share of the socioeconomic activity of the country 
is concentrated in Port au Prince. MAPAP is often referred to as a primate city among the 
policymakers in the country; this concept is further explored in the present study. The explosion of 
MAPAP not only has a negative impact on the city itself (as I experienced while living in the capital) 
but also on all the other cities of the country and their socioeconomic activity (as I experienced in 
my hometown of Jacmel). The explosion of MAPAP has a negative impact over the entire country. 
The phenomenon of urban primacy occurs in all parts of the globe, including developing 
countries. Policymakers seek to address the problems linked to urban primacy by promoting 
decentralization policies. There are several definitions of decentralization. One of the best general 
definition is provided by Rondinelli, et. al.: “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, 
and resource-raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of central 
government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-
autonomous public authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or 
(e) NGOs/PVOs.” (Rondinelli 1981). In addition, Wolman (in Bennet, 1990) identifies different 
types of decentralization: political decentralization, administrative decentralization, and economic 
decentralization. The present study focuses on economic decentralization, as it is missing from the 
current decentralization policy and the debate surrounding it in Haiti.  
For more than two decades, the Haitian government has had the opportunity and the 
constitutional obligation to address these problems by implementing sustainable political and 
administrative decentralization policies. Decentralization is one of the innovations embedded in the 
last Haitian constitution of 1987. It was included as a means to promote citizens’ participation in the 
democratic process by transferring some of the power from the central government to local 
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institutions managed by locally elected officials. The local institutions also became responsible for 
the socioeconomic development of the territory under their control.  
The debate around decentralization essentially revolves around amending the constitution to 
write new laws that will make decentralization more practical and that will better define the role of 
local institutions. The reinforcement of local institutions includes financial support to purchase basic 
office supplies and equipment such as computers, printers, and copiers. It also includes technical 
assistance to train elected officials and staff to better understand their role and perform their duties. 
The proposed solutions have not ensured the success of an effective and sustainable decentralization 
policy because the local collectivity will still financially depend on the central government. Indeed, 
the local Haitian collectivities traditionally receive funds for their functioning budget from the 
central government, which collects taxes over the entire national territory. Today, only the 
municipality of Cap-Haïtien collects a larger amount of tax revenue than it receives from the central 
government. Even in this case, the revenue is not sufficient to invest in socioeconomic programs. 
Decentralization requires the ability of local collectivities to self-generate a steady flow of revenue 
from collecting taxes on personal income and businesses. Given that socioeconomic activities and 
infrastructure of Haiti are disproportionably concentrated in Port au Prince, there are limited taxable 
incomes and economic activities in the other regions. To make decentralization a sustainable reality, 
it is necessary to increase taxable incomes and economic activities outside MAPAP. This requires 
allocating public investments and encouraging private investments in the other regions, i.e, 
implementing economic decentralization; that is not currently the case in Haiti.  
In 2007, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation published the National Strategy 
for Growth and Poverty Reduction Document (NSGPRD) for 2008–2010 (MPCE November 
2007). This document presents the economic policy of the Haitian government for this period. 
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Unfortunately, this document does not present a different or comprehensive strategy to address the 
consequences of urban primacy and the concentration of the population and socioeconomic activity 
of the country in MAPAP.   
In addition, based on the tradition of equal decentralization for each local collectivity (each 
collectivity should have the same power and rights and receive the same amount of public 
investments), scholars writing about the decentralization process in Haiti have failed to analyze the 
interactions among the different elements of the geographic space (e.g., urban system, varying sizes 
of cities, rural and urban areas) and the role that the repartition of social and economic activities 
beyond the administrative limits can play in explaining the success or failure of the decentralization 
process. More importantly, scholars failed to investigate the role that cities and the structure of the 
urban system could play in the decentralization process. The discourse about promoting local 
development outside of the MAPAP mostly revolves around promoting a more effective agricultural 
development. To be effective, a national decentralization policy should have an economic 
decentralization component that is based on reinforcing elements of the socioeconomic geographic 
landscape, such as the major urban centers outside the primate city. This study will fill this gap in the 
literature. 
Instead of trying to achieve decentralization by promoting only rural development, my 
argument is that the government should also focus on the development of a more diverse economy 
and a more balanced urban system by channeling the population and socioeconomic activities 
toward key urban centers. The main question to be answered in this context is where to concentrate the 
efforts? This is the main question of every decentralization policy, and the field of economic 
geography provides the best answer. Decentralization policies are implemented by policymakers 
through “growth poles” (i.e., cities where public investments are concentrated and where private 
investments are promoted). These cities are selected because of specific characteristics that will make 
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these investments sustainable and promote growth over a defined geographic area. Growth poles are 
also called “secondary cities.” These concepts are further explored in the study. 
Based on my knowledge of the Haitian urban system, my intuition was initially that the 
efforts should be concentrated in the regional capitals, which are the main cities and the 
administrative centers of the upper sub-national territorial division called Departments. With the 
present study, I have worked on confirming my intuition through scientific answers. The main 
objectives of the study are: 
• To identify the cities that have the characteristics to be potential “growth poles”  
• To explain how these cities differ from the other cities  
• To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in order to 
increase the chance of success of the decentralization process and reduce the negative 
consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will improve the 
NSGPRD.  
The dissertation begins with general historical and socioeconomic information about Haiti. 
It is followed by the “Problem statement and Justification” chapter that presents MAPAP as a poor, 
overcrowded, and unmanageable urban center and discusses the rural areas that are too poor and 
environmentally fragile to offer a decent life to their actual population, the essential role that the 
departmental capitals can play, and the constitutional requirement that is decentralization. 
In the literature review, I have explored the concept of urban primacy and the consequences 
of urban primacy in the developing world; the causes of the failure of decentralization and regional 
development policies in developing countries; and the application of growth pole theory as a policy 
framework for developing countries and dependency theory.  
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I have used frameworks and theories from the fields of geography (growth pole theory) and 
international development (dependency theory) to reach the objectives of this study. By doing so, I 
have also tested propositions or hypotheses related to these theories in the Haitian context.  
The choice of data and indicators reflects the availability of consistent data on the eight units 
of analysis. For all data used, I present the rationale behind the choice to use the data as well as the 
limitations of the data. I have used migration and population data to study the influence of the 
regional capitals in the national and regional urban systems. I have used basic statistical analysis and 
GIS to display and analyze the data. I have used the results to formulate policy recommendations 
and identify the cities where socioeconomic activities should be delocalized from Port au Prince to 
ensure the success of the decentralization process. Haiti is used as a case study to test some 
propositions or hypotheses related to the growth pole and dependency theories but, although the 
same problems occur all over the developing world, the findings of this study are unique and the 
conclusion I have drawn should be applied with care outside the Haitian context. 
In the concluding chapter I present an evaluation of my findings in light of the literature 
presented and the contribution of the research to the body of knowledge on Haiti, decentralization, 
dependency, urban primacy, and development theories, the limitations of the research and the need 
for future researches. I will also discuss the policy relevance and implications of the research, made 
even more relevant by the devastating earthquake of January 12, 2010. 
The January 12, 2010, earthquake shone a brighter light on most of the issues raised by the 
present research and makes its policy relevance even more important. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 
earthquake hit Haiti, devastating MAPAP and the cities of Legoane, Jacmel, and Grand Goave. This 
catastrophe took the lives of an estimated 200,000 people and left half a million homeless. The 
Haitian government estimates that between 217,000 and 230,000 people died; 300,000 were injured; 
and 1,000,000 were left homeless. In addition, an estimated 250,000 residences and 30,000 
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commercial buildings collapsed or were severely damaged. The port and the airport of Port au 
Prince were also severely damaged. The loss due to the earthquake is estimated to be 120% of the 
2009 GDP; 70% of the lost account for the private sector and 30% accounts for the public sector.  
The January 12, 2010, earthquake demonstrated how MAPAP is poor, overcrowded, and 
unmanageable. These characteristics of the capital and its surroundings explain the high death toll 
and the inability to access some of the neighborhoods. Soon after the earthquake, thousands of 
people took it upon themselves to flee to the countryside or other cities to escape Port au Prince 
and the chaos, growing security issues, lack of food, and insalubrities. 
The concentration of infrastructure, economic activity, and population in MAPAP became 
the reason for the logistical nightmare for delivering much needed emergency aid both in the capital 
and in the other cities affected by the earthquake. MAPAP has the only airport capable of receiving 
large planes and the only port facility capable of harboring the large ships sent to deliver 
humanitarian aid to the earthquake victims and survivors. Both facilities were severely damaged by 
the earthquake and made it impossible to deliver the much-needed help, not only in MAPAP but 
also in other areas. After some quick repairs, the port and airport became very quickly congested and 
bottlenecked, delaying the arrival of rescue and emergency teams and the delivery of aid. As a result, 
access to other cities could have been useful for delivering supplies to Port au Prince. The isolation 
of the other cities also left their population out of attention of the international press and thus from 
the international community concern for several days. Today, more than ever, there is an urgent 
need to promote economic decentralization.  
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General Background Information  
This chapter presents the geography of Haiti; some general socioeconomic, historical, and 
political data that depict a very poor country; an overview of Haiti’s tumultuous history; and the 
complex history of the influence of the international community in Haiti. This information will help 
the reader better understand the present research by presenting an overview of the context in which 
it is conducted.  
Geography 
Haiti is located on Hispaniola, the second largest island of the Antilles. It occupies 
approximately the western one-third of the island that it shares with the Dominican Republic. Its 
surface is 10,714 square miles (map 1).   
“Haiti” means little mountain (or mountainous land) in the language of the Tainos/Arawaks, 
the native inhabitants of the island. The country is very mountainous, with steep slopes and small 
inland and narrow coastal plains (map 1).  
From north to south, there are the following mountain ranges: 
• Massif du Nord in the northern part of the country  
• Montagne Noire in the center of the country 
• Chaine des Mateux and Chaine du Trou d’Eau in the southern area of the center 
of the country 
• Chaine de la Selle (includes Pic la Selle, the highest point of Haiti with a height 
of 8,793 feet) and Massif de la Hotte occupying the length of the southern 
peninsula from east to west 
These mountain ranges are separated by a series of inland plains and valleys: 
• Plaine du Cul de Sac separating the southern peninsula from the rest of the 
country 
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• Vallée de l‘Artibonite in which runs the most important river of the country, 
the Artibonite river 
In addition, there are two main coastal plains:  
• Plaine du Nord in the North 
• Plaines des Cayes in the southwest part of the southern peninsula 
The road network is rudimentary in Haiti. At the national level, the main roads link the main 
cities to the capital, Port-au-Prince. In addition, local road networks link cities within a geographic 
entity and are generally centered around the main urban center of the geographic entity (map 1). The 
topography of Haiti and the poor state of the road network separate the country into isolated 
geographic entities and consequentially affects the geographic areas of influence of the regional 
capitals (Anglade 1982).  
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Map 1: Topography and road map of Haiti  
 
Source: Wikipedia (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/8/83/20090309223036!Haïti_topographic_map-fr.png) 
 
 
General Socioeconomic Data  
The population of Haiti is young and the country’s inhabitants are split between the rural 
and urban areas. According to the Haitian Bureau of Statistics, by 2010, Haiti will have 10,085,214 
inhabitants; 49% will live in urban areas and 51% will live in rural areas. The group age of 25-years-
old and younger will represent 58.4% of the population, and the population density will be 941.31 
inhabitants per square miles (IHSI 2001).  
The Haitian economy’s structure is that of a developing country. According to data from the 
Central Bank of Haiti, the Haitian economy is dominated by the tertiary sector (retail, the restaurant 
and hotel industry, transportation and communication, other trade and non-trade services), which 
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accounts for 58% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP); the primary sector (agriculture, 
forestry, cattle, fishing, and extractives industries), which accounts for 25% of the GDP; and the 
secondary sector (manufacturing industries, electricity and water services, construction, and public 
works) that comprises the remaining 17% of the GDP.  
In terms of GDP per capita, Haiti is ranked 152 out of 179 countries by the International 
Monetary Funds (IMF) with US$791 a year; and 125 out of 170 by the World Bank with US$771 a 
year. In comparison, the second poorest country of the hemisphere, Nicaragua, is ranked 141 (with 
US$1,025 a year) and 125 (with US$1,161 a year) by the IMF and the World Bank, respectively.  
In addition, the statistical data of the United Nations show that 65% of the Haitian 
population lives below the national poverty line: 53.9% live on less that US$1 a day and 78% live on 
less than US$2 a day. The adult literacy rate is around 54.8%. The life expectancy at birth is 61 years 
and there are 25 doctors for every 100,000 inhabitants. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western 
hemisphere. 
Historical Background   
The Colonial Period 
Haiti has had a unique and tumultuous history since Christopher Columbus landed, on 
December 5, 1492, on an island known as Quisqueya, Haití, or Bohío by the Tainos Indians, who 
were the native inhabitants (Wilson 1990). He renamed the island Hispaniola, after the Spanish 
crown, and established the New World’s first Spanish settlement near the site of present-day Cap 
Haïtien. He built a fort called La Navidad and left behind a crew of thirty before returning to Spain 
(Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Bellegarde 1953).  
The Spanish colonization of the island was based on exploitation of its gold mines. What 
started as a peaceful cohabitation between the Spaniards and the Tainos turned into an open 
conflict, the enslavement of the Tainos by the Spaniards in search of gold and the killing of Tainos 
 14 
 
leaders. With their horses, dogs, armors, and iron weapons, the Spaniards easily defeated the 
peaceful Tainos. They also brought diseases that caused the eradication of the majority of the native 
population (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Bellegarde 1953; Pons 1995).     
In 1697, France and Spain in their continuing battle to colonize the New World, signed the 
Treaty of Wyswick that placed the western part of the island, renamed Saint Domingue, under 
French control and the eastern part (that kept the name of Hispaniola) under Spanish control. The 
economy of the new French colony of Saint Domingue was based on the culture and transformation 
of sugarcane into sugar. In the eighteenth century, Saint Domingue was the most prosperous French 
colony in the New World, producing 40% of the world’s sugar. The French brought Africans to 
work as slaves on the sugarcane plantations. In the late 1780s there were approximately 450,000 
African slaves, 30,000 colonists, and 300,000 mulattoes in Saint Domingue (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 
1947/1948; Bellegarde 1953; Geggus 1990). 
The everyday life of the slaves in the French colonial empire was regimented by the Code 
Noir, or Black Code. The Code Noir was a decree passed in 1685 by Louis XIV restricting the 
activities of African slaves and defining the relationship between African slaves, mulattoes and white 
colonists in the French colonial empire. The Code Noir was a very extensive document that 
established the rules for religious practices, marriage, food, the selling of slaves, working hours, and 
punishment. Slaves were kept in subhuman living conditions.  
Appalled by these conditions, some runaway slaves banded together to form independent 
communities in the mountains, they were known as Maroons (Fick 1990). There were many attempts 
to foment a revolution, but they were sporadic and limited in the number of slaves involved. When 
the slaves were defeated, the participants were severely punished, tortured, and even put to death to 
discourage future attempts to revolt. After several failed attempts, the slaves successfully revolted in 
1791. 
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The 1791 revolution was based on a grassroots movement that included a substantial 
percentage of the slaves of the colony. The slaves found their inspiration in the French revolution 
and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in August 1789 by the French National 
Constituent Assembly, which stated that all men are equal. In addition, the slaves were bound 
together by the willingness to be free and escape the inhumane conditions of slavery. They were led 
by Boukman Duty, a voodoo priest. Under his leadership, the slaves, convinced that they were 
protected by the divine power of the voodoo gods, made a pact to fight to death for freedom during 
a ceremony held in Bois Caiman on the night of August 21, 1791. The slave uprising exploded on 
the night of August 22, 1791 (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Fick 1990).  
The Haitian Revolutionary War lasted until the Battle of Vertières, which took place on 
November 22, 1803, in northern Haiti near Cap Haïtien and was led by Jean Jacques Dessalines, the 
first president of Haiti. Another famous figure of the Haitian revolution was François Dominique 
Toussaint L’Ouverture (1743–1803), also known simply as Toussaint L'Ouverture, who was born 
into slavery and freed by his master at the age of 33. He was fortunate enough to be literate and was 
well-versed in French literature and the Enlightenment. He joined the Haitian Revolutionary War 
after the French gave full citizenship to free blacks and free mulattoes on April 4, 1792, and 
abolished slavery in February 1794; both decisions were fought against by the French colonists of 
Saint Domingue (Cesaire 1981). Toussaint L’Ouverture rose to become the leader of the Haitian 
revolution, fighting against the French, Spanish, and British to end slavery on the entire island. He 
succeeded by consolidating all the revolutionary forces using his leadership. He defeated the Spanish 
in 1801 and proclaimed the abolition of slavery on the island. He also published the first Haitian 
Constitution of 1801, which named him emperor for life with near absolute power (Dorsainvil 1924; 
Madiou 1947/1948; Fick 1990).  
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Napoleon Bonaparte tried to re-conquer the most profitable French colony in the New 
World and reinstate slavery in Saint Domingue. He sent his brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc 
with the order to defeat Toussaint L’Ouverture and take control of the island on January 20, 1802. 
After fighting against the French for months, Toussaint L’Ouverture signed a treaty with Leclerc 
prohibiting the return of slavery on the island before retiring from power. Despite the promise he 
made with the treaty, Leclerc captured Toussaint L’Ouverture and his family and sent them to 
France as captives. Toussaint L'Ouverture died of pneumonia on April 7, 1803, in the Fort de Joux 
in the Jura Mountains where he was jailed (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Fick 1990). 
Toussaint L’Ouverture’s story has an important historical significance even outside of Haiti and has 
been intensely explored for example in 1936 by the Trinidadian historian C. L. R. James in the book 
Toussaint L’Ouverture and The Black Jacobins.  
The Haitian Presidencies 
The Haitian presidencies illustrate the instability of the Haitian political life punctuated by 
military coups, overthrows, and assassinations. From its independence in 1804 to the present, Haiti 
has been led by 53 presidents: 9 served their full term, 23 were overthrown, and the rest were 
assassinated or died in office (Dorsainvil 1924; Madiou 1947/1948; Barros 1984).   
The Haitian president who served the longest is Jean Claude Duvalier (a.k.a. Baby Doc), who 
stayed in power for 15 years after succeeding his father, François Duvalier (a.k.a. Papa Doc), who 
led Haiti for 14 years (1957–1971). François Duvalier was a physician who championed the fight 
against yaws and malaria in Haiti’s rural areas. In December 1956, Haitian president Paul Eugène 
Magloire left the presidency. A year later, Duvalier won the presidential election organized by the 
army and took power on September 22nd, 1957. After a coup against him failed in mid-1958, he 
started consolidating his power by creating the infamous Tontons Macoutes, a mainly rural militia that 
perpetrated crimes and executions. On June 14, 1964, Duvalier conducted a referendum on whether 
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or not he should be the president for life, which he won. His regime became a dictatorship plagued 
with corruption, crime, censorship, a cult of personality, and defiance of the international 
community (Barros 1984).  
Before his death in 1971, François Duvalier nominated his then 19-year-old son, Jean Claude 
Duvalier, to replace president for life. Baby Doc eased some of his father’s restrictions and allowed 
more freedom of the press, which opened the gates of political and social unrest. He was 
overthrown by a popular uprising on February 7, 1986.  
The Haitian political life after Baby Doc was filled with military coups, failed elected 
presidencies, interim government bodies, and the country’s first democratically elected presidents. 
Leslie Manigat won the first post-Duvalier (although controversial) elections on January 19, 1988, 
but was overthrown on June 20 of the same year by a military coup. Manigat’s government was 
followed by two military governments led by Henry Namphy and Prosper Avril. Power was also 
held by the first female president, Herta Pascal Trouillot, from 1990 to 1991. She successfully helped 
organize the first truly democratic Haitian elections in 1990.  
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a young priest and proponent of liberation theology, won the 1990 
presidential elections, but he was overthrown by a military coup on September 29, 1991. He was put 
back in power by the U.S. government under Bill Clinton in 1993, and served the remainder of his 
term until 1996. The Haitian constitution prohibits successive presidential mandates, and Aristide 
could not run for re-election in 1996. Instead, Aristide’s right hand man and former Prime Minister 
René Garcia Préval ran for office. He won the election and served the full term until 2000. In 2000 
Aristide ran for president again and regained power. He left the country in 2004 because of growing 
social and political unrest and the risk of a military attack supported by a former military leader. To 
this day, Aristide insists that the French, Canadians, and Americans kidnapped him. He now lives in 
 18 
 
South Africa. Former president René Garcia Préval won the presidential election in 2006 and is still 
in power today.  
One of the first decisions Aristide took when he returned to Haiti in 1993 was to dismantle 
the Haitian army and replace it with a civilian police force. By doing so, he eliminated the main agent 
of political instability that fomented all the coups of Haitian history (Delince 1979). However, 
increasing poverty, corruption, and discontent toward the government are at the root of a quasi-
permanent political and social instability, violence, and insecurity (Roc February 21, 2003). For 
example, the impoverished population of Haiti was hit hard in mid-2008 by the increase in the price 
of rice on the international market. Street protests paralyzed Port-au-Prince and turned into 
violence, resulting in the deaths of several people. Several members of the government, including 
the Prime Minister, were forced to resign under pressure from the population and the opposition. 
Political instability and social tensions are the major constraints to Haiti’s development.  
Political Institutions/Organizations and a New Role for 
Local Collectivities  
Haiti’s political instability is also reflected in the number of constitutions that have governed 
the country since its independence. Twenty-three different constitutions have been used; each 
redefining the political structures, the share of power, the length of the presidential terms, 
election/nomination processes, and the ownership of land by foreign entities (Janvier 1886; Moise 
1997). Today Haiti is governed by the most recent constitution of March 29, 1987 (Le Moniteur 
Juillet 1987). This constitution was written a year after the end of the Duvalier regime and focused 
on a better balance of power to prevent another dictatorship.  
Haiti is a republic with three branches of power: executive, judicial, and legislative. In 
addition to the central government, the new constitution redefines and grants more power to local 
institutions governed by locally elected officials in order to promote decentralization. The intent of 
decentralization is to reduce the power of the central government by transferring some of the power 
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to the local institutions. It also aims to foster citizens’ participation in the development process and 
create a better distribution of wealth.  
The new constitution also divides the national territory into four levels of sub-national 
territorial administrative entities: 10 departments, 42 arrondissements, 136 communes, and 519 communal 
sections. The departments and communes have a capital that is traditionally the main city. The communal 
sections are new local collectivities.  
 
Only the communes and sections communales have directly elected officials. The governing organs 
of the arrondissements and departments are formed by selecting leaders of the communes and sections 
communales. These governing organs are the Assembly and the Council. The Assembly is the 
deliberative body of the local collectivities, and the Council is the executive body of the local 
collectivities (Oriol Decembre 1993; Le Moniteur Juillet 1987). The new roles and the new organs 
are crucial for the implementation of decentralization.  
The International Community and Haiti  
The international community has a long history of involvement with Haiti, from its 
independence to today. For years after 1804, Haiti was punished and kept isolated for declaring its 
independence from one of the most powerful colonial empires, and it was later occupied by the 
United States. In recent years, several United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions have been 
deployed in the country to secure the democratic process.  
The Early National Period 
The international community history with Haiti began shortly after the country gained its 
independence in 1804. It took the international community more than twenty years to recognize 
Haiti as an independent country and an equal trade partner. Although the Haitian revolutionary 
army defeated the French army and the new leaders of Haiti declared independence in 1804, France 
formally recognized the independence of Haiti only in 1834 after Haiti started paying France 150 
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million francs (about $25 billion in current U.S. dollars) as compensation for the loss that the 
colonists suffered during the revolutionary war. Even the United States recognized Haitian 
independence only in 1862. This delay in recognizing Haiti’s independence was a way for all colonial 
powers of the time to discourage slave revolts in other colonies. 
Unfortunately, during this time, the country remained isolated and fell into poverty, deprived 
of markets to sell its agricultural production. In addition, the initial debt put a heavy burden on the 
development of Haiti (Gaillard-Pourchet 1990; Farmer 2003).  The end of slavery, the 
implementation of new administrative structures and organs and the new economic policies adopted 
by the leaders of the newly independent country profoundly changed the settlement patterns in 
Haiti. These changes are further explored later in this study.  
U.S. Occupation of Haiti (1915–1934) 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the political instability in Haiti reached a new 
boiling point: from 1911 to 1915, six presidents governed the country, all of whom were 
assassinated or overthrown.  Finally, in order to protect U.S. investments in Haiti, President 
Woodrow Wilson sent 300 marines to Port au Prince on July 28, 1915. The official purpose of the 
invasion was to re-establish and maintain peace. However, it was the beginning of the U.S. 
occupation of Haiti that lasted until mid-august 1934.  
During the occupation Haiti lived through a period of relative political stability, with four 
successive full-term presidencies. However, the United States gained increasing control over the 
Haitian economy and government by having veto power over the main decisions of the government. 
The United States also adopted a new constitution written by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, which lifted the ban on foreigners owning land in Haiti. The occupation 
consolidated and extended American economic interests in Haiti. The occupation came to an end 
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because of growing opposition in Haiti and the United States (Dorsainvil 1924; Bellegarde 1953; 
Barros 1984; Gaillard-Pourchet 1990; Moise 1997; Farmer 2003; Molineu August 1973).      
The economic and administrative policies carried out during the US occupation of Haiti has 
long term consequences on the Haitian urban structure. These consequences are further explored 
later in this study.  
UN Peacekeeping Missions 
The international community has been also involved with Haiti in six successive UN 
peacekeeping missions. The first mission began in 1993 when the Clinton Administration reinstated 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The mission was designed to prevent another coup and ensure that 
Aristide would serve the remainder of his term. Since then, Haiti always has some form of UN 
mission that helps maintain peace and stability in a country plagued with drug trafficking and 
political and social unrest. The UN missions also have the objectives of strengthening the Haitian 
government and building the stable institutions necessary to build a democratic society. The UN 
missions’ activities range from securing elections to training the new civilian police force, the Police 
National of Haiti (table 1).   
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 Table 1: United Nations peacekeeping missions in Haiti  
 
Dates of operation Name of operation Objectives 
1993–1996 United Nations Mission in Haiti 
(UNMIH) 
1991 coup and military rule in Haiti 
1996–1997 United Nations Support Mission in 
Haiti (UNSMIH) 
Stabilizing Haiti’s new democracy 
1997 United Nations Transition Mission in 
Haiti (UNTMIH) 
Training of the Haitian National 
Police 
1997–2000 United Nations Civilian Police 
Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) 
Training of the Haitian National 
Police 
2000–2001 United Nations General Assembly 
International Civilian Support Mission 
in Haiti (MICAH) 
Training of the Haitian National 
Police 
2004–present The United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
Restore a secure and stable 
environment, promote the political 
process, strengthen Haiti’s 
government institutions and rule-of-
law-structures, and promote and to 
protect human rights. 
 
The International Community and the Haitian Economy  
Haiti depends in large part on international financial institutions for its development. Haiti 
has a total external debt of US $ 1.4 billion. Forty-five percent of this debt was accumulated under 
the François Duvalier dictatorship. To ensure that the money will be reimbursed, IMF and the 
international financial institutions imposed a Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) on the Haitian 
government in 1997. One of the requirements of the SAP is the drastic reduction of public 
investments in social services and a greater opening of the economy to the international market.  
Because of the negative impact of the debt on Haiti’s economy and development, several initiatives 
have been launched to lobby the debtors to cancel the debt.  
The interactions among the successive internal and external forces (political, social and 
economic) have played an important role in shaping the Haitian urban system. This link between the 
role of the international community in the economy and the Haitian urbanization patterns is further 
explored later in this study.  
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Problem statement and justification  
 
The main objectives of the study are: 
 To identify the cities that have the characteristics to be potential “growth poles”  
 To explain how these cities differ from the other cities  
 To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in order 
to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process and reduce the 
negative consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will improve 
the NSGPRD.  
This chapter presents the urbanization patterns of Haiti and its impacts on the development of 
the country. It focuses on 1) the effects of the concentration of the population in the Metropolitan 
Area of Port au Prince (MAPAP), 2) the need to promote orderly migration from the rural areas to 
the other cities of the country and the role that the other regional capitals could play. Finally, 3) it 
explores the state of the ongoing decentralization process and its inadequacy in addressing those 
issues. By its objectives, the present study will contribute to solving these problems.  
The Metropolitan Area of Port-Au-Prince: Overcrowded, 
Poor, and Unmanageable  
Urbanization is a recent development in Haiti. From 1950 to 2003, the urban population 
grew from being 12% to 40.4% of the total population. This growth has caused the demographic 
explosion of MAPAP that includes the national capital of Port-au-Prince and the urban areas of the 
surrounding municipalities of Carrefour, Croix des Bouquets, Cité Soleil, Tabarre, Delmas, Pétion 
Ville, and Kenscoff. Today, MAPAP has a population of 2.5 million and covers a total surface of 
1,300 square kilometers.  
With 2.5 million people, the MAPAP represents about 25% of the total population and 64% 
of the urban population of Haiti (figure 1) (IHSI 2005). It is 16.13 times larger than the city of Cap 
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Haïtien in the north, the second largest city in the country.  Although it occupies only 1/22 of the 
national territory, its economic activities represent 90% of the national secondary sector of industry 
and 75% of the tertiary sector of the national industry. MAPAP overshadows the other cities with its 
size and influence. It has become a “Republic in the Republic,” the “Republic of Port au Prince” 
(Anglade 1982; Anglade 1990).  
Figure 1: Percentage of the total urban population living in each department 
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Source: Haitian Institute of Statistic and Informatics (IHSI), RGPH 2003 
MAPAP suffers from its success: the literature about the metropolis is very pessimistic and 
alarmist. Manigat describes it as a chaotic landscape which seems impossible to overcome (Portes 
1997). The growth of the city escapes all administrative control and the entire city has acquired the 
physiognomy of a slum (Holly 1999). The metropolitan area is in crisis and is characterized by 
violence, economic informality, and poverty (Fass 1978; Houtard 1997).  
Public and private investments in infrastructures and job creation activities are not sufficient 
to follow the rapid pace and growth of MAPAP. There is a shortage of jobs for the actual dwellers 
of the city. The government and local institutions cannot meet the city’s needs for decent housing 
and access to basic services. The city is very poor: 75% percent of urban dwellers work in the 
informal sector of the economy; 25% of its surface is covered by slums where 50% of the 
population lives in inhuman conditions without access to basic services such as decent housing, 
water, sanitation (54% of the houses do not have sanitation), and electricity (Experoco International 
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2003). Finally, 60% live under the poverty line on less than US $2 a day on which to survive 
(Lamauthe 2002). The MAPAP is unable to provide newcomers with economic opportunities and 
basic services. 
MAPAP is also sprawling on a fragile physical environment. The site is a coastal plain 
surrounded by the Morne l’Hopital, a mountain chain (Corvington 1991; Lherisson Juin 2004). The 
development of the city on a fragile area presents a danger both for the environment and the urban 
dwellers. The forest that used to cover the Morne l’Hopital has completely disappeared. The fertile 
lands in the plain are completely urbanized, reducing the areas of agricultural production for a 
growing population. Both phenomena have contributed in reducing the infiltration of rainwater in 
the soil, decreasing the level of underground water and increasing the volume of surface water. 
MAPAP dwellers frequently experience water shortages. Each year during the rainy season, 
hundreds of houses are wiped out along with their occupants by the flood of surface water. The 
same catastrophe also happens in the lower floodable areas (Holly 1999).  
These problems are most likely to worsen in the near future: 63.80% of the total number of 
migrants live in the Department of the West and 57.99% live in MAPAP; 84.10% of the number of 
migrants from other departments live in the West and 78.46% in MAPAP (Table 2). It is necessary 
to halt the growth of MAPAP in order to increase the impact of poverty reduction strategies and 
sustainable development programs. This implies managing the natural growth of its population and 
reducing the number of incoming migrants.
 26 
 
Table 2: Number and percentage of the total migrants living in each department by place of origin  
  Place of origin 
Place of 
residence Urban % Rural % Total % Other Dpts % Foreigners % Total % 
South East         3,892          2.45          9,618          4.38        13,510          3.58         5,033         1.08          1,384         7.98      19,927          2.31  
North       20,494        12.91        24,123       10.98        44,617        11.81       16,128         3.45          1,637         9.44      62,382          7.24  
North East         5,155          3.25          5,217          2.37        10,372          2.75         4,813         1.03          2,660       15.34      17,845          2.07  
Artibonite       10,621          6.69        34,074       15.50        44,695        11.83       15,874         3.40             448         2.58      61,017          7.08  
Centre         2,709          1.71        61,244       27.87        64,643        17.11         5,993         1.28          1,003         5.79      71,639          8.31  
South         6,124          3.86        14,803          6.74        20,927          5.54         8,754         1.87             849         4.90      30,530          3.54  
Grande Anse         4,400          2.77          5,459          2.48          9,859          2.61       11,456         2.45             321         1.85      21,636          2.51  
North West         8,378          5.28        13,239          6.02        20,201          5.35         6,209         1.33             712         4.11      27,122          3.15  
West       96,986        61.09        52,005       23.66     148,991        39.43     392,756       84.10          8,321       48.00    550,068        63.80  
Total    158,759      100.00     219,782     100.00     377,815      100.00     467,016     100.00        17,335    100.00    862,166     100.00  
%         18.41            25.49            43.82           54.17              2.01        100.00    
Urban    131,578        82.88     110,042       50.07     241,463        63.91     414,385       88.73        12,113       69.88    667,961        77.47  
%         19.70            16.47            36.15           62.04              1.81        100.00    
Rural       27,181        17.12     109,740       49.93     136,352        36.09       52,631       11.27          5,222       30.12    194,205        22.53  
%         14.00            56.51            70.21           27.10              2.69        100.00    
                          
MAPAP       33,432        21.06        29,801          13.6        63,233        16.74     366,419       78.46          7,117       41.06    500,002        57.99  
%           6.69              5.96            12.65           73.28              1.42        100.00    
  Source: Haitian Institute of Statistic and Informatics (IHSI), RGPH 2003  
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Rural Areas: Overpopulated, Impoverished, and 
Environmentally Degraded   
Migrants to MAPAP come from rural areas and the other cities in the country (IHSI 1989). 
The peasants leave the countryside to escape poverty. Rural poverty is due to the destruction of the 
environment, overpopulation, and the lack of economic opportunities and very limited access basic 
services. However, maintaining peasants in the countryside will increase the environmental 
degradation and the cultivable land will not provide them with sufficient income to live above the 
poverty line.  
As explained before Haiti is a very mountainous country. It has experienced extensive 
environmental degradation due to long-term intense deforestation to produce charcoal (the main 
source of energy in Haiti) or to use the land for agricultural purposes. The result is steep slopes 
exposed to the action of erosion, reducing the cultivable surfaces and the productivity of the lands 
(Anglade 1982; C.E.G.E.T. 1985; Anglade 1990).   
Haiti’s rural area has a high population density living on already fragile land. The surface 
suitable for agricultural activities is not sufficient to provide each rural household with revenue to 
live above the poverty line. A recent study on poverty in Haiti shows that 90% of the poor 
inhabitants in the rural areas live on between US$1 and US$2 per day per family. Fleeing the 
countryside is the only hope for Haitian peasants seeking to improve their living conditions (UNDP 
2002).  
It is imperative to stabilize and even reverse the population growth rate in the rural areas in 
order to reduce the human pressure on the fragile rural environment. Fortunately, the data from the 
last Haitian census show migration patterns with an exodus from the rural areas and the 
concentration of the population in urban areas (Table 2):  
i. 77.47% of the total number of migrants live in urban areas.  
ii. 63.91% of the total internal migrants (within a department) live in urban areas 
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- 82.88% of the migrants from the urban areas live in other urban areas 
- 50.07% of the migrants from rural areas live in cities 
- 42.02% of the migrants are from cities  
- 58.17% of the migrants are from rural areas  
iii. 88.73% of the migrants from the other departments live in urban areas 
The migration from rural areas to urban areas contributes to a reduction of the population 
growth rate in the rural areas. It also reduces the number of people who will otherwise depend on 
agriculture to make a living.  
At the same time, MAPAP, receiving the major fraction of the migration, is facing 
tremendous challenges and cannot provide the newcomers with the economic and social 
opportunities that will improve their lives. The alternative locations for rural dwellers to migrate to 
are the other cities of the country. These considerations should be included in poverty alleviation 
and development programs.   
The Departmental Capitals: Key Demographic, 
Administrative, and Political Characteristics to Play A 
Buffer Role Between the Rural Area and the MAPAP 
With the exclusion of the MAPAP, most cities in the Haitian urban system are of small size.1 
The frequency distribution table of the 124 Haitian cities (by size and percentage of the total urban 
population in each group) illustrates this statement (table 3). While the number of cities with less 
than 10,000 inhabitants represents 71.90 % of the total number of cities, this group also represents 
only 9.34 % of the total urban population (figures 2 and 3). These small cities do not have sufficient 
attraction power to capture or retain the flow of rural migrants trying to escape the extreme poverty 
of the countryside as it is going to be explained later on in the study.   
                                                 
1 There is no legal definition of “city” in the Haïtian legislation. In the national statistics, all the municipal capitals are “cities” and their 
populations are counted as urban no matter their size.  
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Table 3: Number and percentages of the Haitian urban population by size of the cities  
 
Population 
Number 
of cities 
 Percentage of 
the total 
number of 
cities  
Cumulative 
percentage 
Percentage of 
total urban 
population 
Cumulative 
percentage 
0–999 9 7.44 7.44 0.21 0.21 
1,000–4,999 58 47.93 55.37 4.8 5.01 
5,000–9,999 20 16.53 71.90 4.33 9.34 
10,000–19,999 25 20.66 92.56 11.37 20.71 
20,000–49,999 7 5.79 98.35 5.92 26.63 
50,000 and up 5 1.65 100.00 73.37 100 
Total 124 100.00   100.00   
Source: Haitian Institute of Statistic and Informatics (IHSI), RGPH 2003 
 
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of Haitian cities by size  
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of the percentage of the urban population by size of cities  
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However, a limited number of cities are distinctive because of their size. About twenty cities 
have a population between 15,000 and 20,000 (figure 3) with room to grow. These cities are more 
likely to play a buffer role in reducing the growth of the MAPAP. As it is going to be further 
explained later in this study, larger cities attract more migrants. They also already have a large 
population to support large-scale socio-economic programs that will, in return, increase the number 
of migrants, which will have an impact on reducing the growth of the MAPAP. Winning the fight 
against poverty necessarily means enabling them to attract more migrants, retain them and retain 
their own populations. 
Seven of the departmental capitals are in this group. The departmental capitals are the cities 
of Cap Haïtien, Jacmel, Gonaives, Port de Paix, Fort Liberté, Hinche, les Cayes, and Jérémie. All of 
them except Fort Liberté have a population of more than 15,000 people. Besides their demographic 
characteristics, the departmental capitals have specific political and administrative functions. They 
are the sites of the Délégation and Vice Délégation that represent the political branch of the government 
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at the local levels. The mandate of these institutions is to coordinate the activities of all the central 
technical organs at the departmental level. The capitals are also the sites of, successively, the lowest 
to the highest decentralized political and administrative organs, from the Assembly of the 
Communal Section and the Council of the Communal Section to the Departmental Council and 
Assembly (Bureau du Premier Ministre 2002; Le Moniteur Juillet 1987). Regrouping all these 
administrative, technical, and political organs, the departmental capitals are centers of management, 
coordination, and promotion of developmental policies. As such, they also receive an important part 
of public investments in terms of services and infrastructure. Their demographic, administrative, and 
political characteristics make them practical regional development poles.  
Unfortunately, the regional capitals receive a very small percentage of the total number of 
migrants of the country according to the 2003 census data. While MAPAP receives 57.99% of the 
total number of migrants of the country, the average percentage for the regional capitals is 1.51%; 
Cap Haïtien receives the highest percentage with only 5.16%; along with Cap Haïtien, only 
Gonaives, Les Cayes, and Port de Paix receive more than 1%; Hinche receives the lowest percentage 
with 0.23%  (table 2). It is imperative to channel a larger flow of migrants toward the regional 
capitals in order to reduce the growth of the MAPAP.   
 
Decentralization, a Constitutional Requirement yet to 
be Implemented  
In 1987, Haiti adopted a new constitution. Decentralization (Title IV, Chapter I) was the 
main innovation of the Haitian Constitution and was designed to promote participative 
democratization by relocating the political and administrative powers closer to the population in 
order to promote economic development and provide basic services to all Haitians (Gilbert 2000). 
These goals were to be achieved by putting locally elected officials in charge of local administrations 
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(ARD 1996; Castor 1997). Local collectivities would acquire administrative and financial autonomy 
and become, henceforth, responsible for the promotion and management of their resources and 
their socioeconomic development, and would therefore guarantee access to basic services to the 
population by generating their own resources.  
Almost two decades later, the Haitian government has failed to enforce the prescriptions of 
the constitution regarding decentralization. The technical expertise and the financial resources have 
not yet been transferred to the local collectivities. The local institutions and organs are not fully 
operational. Only the institutions and organs at the communal levels are actually functioning 
(Deshommes 2004; Oriol Decembre 1993). 
The slow start of the process reflects both political reluctance and the difficulty of dealing 
with such a complex challenge. Indeed, decentralization is primarily the expression of the political 
will of the central government to transfer some of its power; it is also the will of the local 
collectivities to build the capabilities and take on new responsibilities (Rondinelli 1978; Brunet 1997; 
Rondinelli August 1984). Unfortunately, these necessary requirements are missing in Haiti (Sylvestre 
2000; Bureau du Premier Ministre 2002; Brunet 2004). The constant political turmoil of the past 
decades has also endangered the implementation of a policy that requires stability and a long-term 
commitment from the central government (Rondinelli 1978; Hurbon 1996; Rondinelli August 1984). 
The slow start of the decentralization process also demonstrates the complexity of the 
decentralization policy and the difficulty in achieving a consensus on how to successfully implement 
it. The debate surrounding decentralization in Haiti is raging: no one is openly against 
decentralization, and the international community is openly supportive of it (Saint Vil 1999). The 
literature tends to depict aspects of the actual process and characteristics of the local collectivities 
that will make the process difficult, even impossible, to implement (Deshommes 2000; Oriol April 
2000). The factors cited are the geographic characteristics such as the size of the local collectivities 
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(INESA Avril 2000; Saint Vil Mars 2005), the socioeconomic characteristics, the flaws in the policy 
itself, the number and fields of responsibility versus too little resources, and the lack of human, 
technical, and financial assets of the municipalities. Finally, some scholars explain this failure by the 
weaknesses of regional and decentralized political and administrative institutions (ARD 1996; 
Cantave 1996; Castor 1997; Saint Vil 1999; Deshommes 2000; Deshommes 2000; Sylvestre 2000; 
Deshommes 2002; Oriol April 2000; INESA Avril 2000; Cadet Déc 2001; Oriol Decembre 1993; 
CNRA March 2002; Saint Vil Mars 2005; Prophete Nov 1999).  
To solve these problems and facilitate the implementation of decentralization, some 
proposed solutions are: reform of local taxes systems (improving the collection of the existing ones 
and raising new ones), reinforcement of local institutions, redrawing of (administrative) boundaries, 
and reduction in the number of local collectivities. Most of the solutions offered propose realistic 
ways to design a policy focusing on the elimination of obstacles (Deshommes 2000; Bureau du 
Premier Ministre 2002; Brunet 2004; Avilez 2006). The policy as well as the debate focuses on 
political and administrative aspects. 
In the tradition of equal decentralization for each local collectivity (each collectivity should 
have the same power and rights and, receive the same amount of public investments), scholars 
writing about the decentralization process in Haiti failed to analyze the interactions among the 
different components of the geographic space and the role that the repartition of social and 
economic activities, beyond the administrative limits, can play in explaining the success or failure of 
the decentralization process. More importantly, they failed to investigate the role that cities and the 
structures of the urban system play in the decentralization process. To be effective, a sound 
decentralization policy should start by reinforcing elements of the geographical landscape that will 
increase its chances of success.  This study will fill this gap in the literature.  
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The concentration of the population in the MAPAP poses important environmental 
problems on the city. This makes it very difficult to manage the city and provide basic urban services 
and employment opportunity to a fast growing population. The high population density of the rural 
areas puts pressure on the environment and increases poverty by contributing to the degradation of 
natural resources.  The regional capitals of Haiti have the demographic and administrative 
characteristics to play a key role in reducing the flow of migrants to the MAPAP and in reducing the 
human pressure on the natural resources of the rural areas. Unfortunately, there has been no policy 
designed to enable them to play this role. Haiti has a constitutional mandate necessary to implement 
decentralization but has yet to fulfill it. One of the questions missing in the debate surrounding how 
to implement decentralization is where to start in order to have the most impact. This study will 
attempt to provide an answer to that question and formulate policy recommendations to improve 
the NSGPRD.  
. 
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Literature Review: Urban Primacy and 
Decentralization Policy in the Third World 
and in Haiti  
 
This chapter reviews the literature about the concepts, policies, debates and theories used to 
conduct this research. It covers urbanization in the Third World and in Haiti, more specifically, 
urban primacy, its causes and its consequences on socio-economic development. It presents the rise 
of decentralization and regional development policies in the Third World and in Haiti to address the 
consequences of urban primacy and the application of some of the growth pole theory assumptions 
and hypothesis to design and evaluate decentralization policies.  
The Concept of Urban Primacy 
The concept of primate city first appeared in 1939 in an article in the Geographical Review 
written by geographer Mark Jefferson. Today this concept is largely used in multidisciplinary 
settings. It refers to the largest city of a country in relationship, in size, to the second largest city. If 
primate, the largest city stands alone in the national urban system, and most of the economic, 
cultural, and intellectual resources of the country are concentrated there. Once a city reaches that 
stage, “this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away 
from all of them in characters and well as in size … It becomes the primate city.” (Jefferson), p.227). 
This trend is worldwide and there is a “Law of the Primate City” where the “largest city shall be 
super eminent and not merely in size, but in national influence” (Jefferson, p.227). A few countries, 
such as Germany or Switzerland, are exceptions to this rule. The author explains these exceptions by 
unusual local circumstances such as spatial administrative structures or economic policies. 
Urban primacy is measured, in terms of population size, as the ratio of the population of the 
largest city to the population of the two next largest cities. Jefferson found a ratio of 100 (100 
representing the population of the primate city) for the largest city and, respectively 30 and 20 for 
the second and third. This comparative technique is still used today to assess the level of primacy of 
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a country.  Haiti is an example of extreme urban primacy with the MAPAP ratio at 100 (population 
of 2.5 millions inhabitants), 8.1 for Cap Haïtien the second most populous city (population of 
204,508 inhabitants) and 6.42 for Gonaives, the third (population of 160,501 inhabitants).   
The Causes and Consequences of Urban Primacy in the 
World, in the Third World and in Haiti 
Most scholars agree about the different factors that explain urban primacy. This chapter 
presents the causes and consequences of urban primacy in general, in the Third World and in Haiti. 
This chapter also presents urban primacy in the context of the general development theories as these 
theories relate to urbanization in the developing world.  
The concept of Urban Primacy  
Jefferson (1939) acknowledges the diversity of original factors that will cause one city to 
exceed the others in the urban system. Such factors include political structure (centralized versus 
decentralized government systems), economic policies, geography of the national territory, and 
infrastructure. These factors echoed the ones identified in regional studies conducted by Stewart 
(1960), Ginsburg (1955), and Browing (March 1958): economic (export-oriented economies), urban 
and human settlement history, colonization, and national land planning policies. Urban primacy 
occurs at different levels depending on the strength or the combination of these factors.  
Urban primacy affects all parts of the globe, such as Western Europe and Australia (Stewart 
1960), Southeast Asia (Ginsburg 1955; Doan 1995; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Moomaw and 
Alwosabi 2003), Africa (Doan 1995) and Latin America (Doan 1995; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; 
Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Browning March 1958). However, the level of urban primacy is 
increasing at an unprecedented rate in developing countries (Kasarda 1991) and more specifically in 
Latin American countries (Potter 1998; Sally 1998; Jacquemin 1999; Drakakis-Smith 2000). Urban 
systems in Third World countries are dominated by one or a limited number (two to three) of 
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metropolises that overshadow the other cities with their size and economic influence (Andrei 1982; 
Kelly 1984; Kasarda 1991; Josef 1997; Potter 1998). The level of urban primacy is highest in Latin 
America (Morse 1962; Angotti 1987; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003).  
Urban primacy is a relatively recent phenomenon in the Third World, where it is reaching 
unprecedented levels. Urbanization in the majority of Third World countries is characterized by its 
recent rapid increase and high level of urban primacy. Indeed, the percentage of the urban 
population grew from 17.9% in 1950 and should reach 57.1% in 2030 in the less-developed 
countries. The increase is even more important for the least developing countries (LDC), where the 
percentage of the urban population grew from 7.4% to 43.3%.2 There are significant differences 
within the Third World. The Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is the most urbanized 
(41.9% in 1950) and shows the highest increase rate, with an estimated 84.6% of its population 
living in cities in 2030 and 42.7% more in 80 years. The least urbanized region is the African 
continent, with only 14.9% of its population living in cities in 1950. However, the continent shows 
the second most important increase and should have 53.5% of its population living in cities by 2030. 
3 Haiti is also witnessing a rapid urbanization: the urban population represented 12 % of the total 
population in 1950 and 40.4 % in 2003.  
The Third World is also witnessing an increase of mega cities: in 2006, 44 of the 100 largest 
cities in the world were located in developing countries across Latin America, Asia, and Africa. 
These mega cities have populations ranging from 3.3 million for Caracas, the Venezuelan capital to 
19.24 million for Mexico City. Although countries like India or Brazil have several mega cities, most 
                                                 
2 Source: http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=1 
 
3 Ibid 
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Third World countries have only one or two mega cities. 4 The MAPAP of Haiti is a mega city with 
2.5 million inhabitants. 
 
Urban primacy has devastating effects both on the primate city and on the development of 
nations in the Third World. Employment opportunities, educational infrastructure and health, social 
and cultural services, economic activities, and modern equipment are all concentrated in the primate 
cities. These assets attract migrants to the primate cities more than other areas of the country; they 
also perpetuate and increase urban primacy. Unfortunately, even though these assets are available in 
the primate cities more than anywhere else, they cannot accommodate and fulfill the needs of the 
fast-growing population. The new comers and a large percentage of the population does not have 
access to employment, economic opportunities, decent housing, health care and other basic services. 
They live in slums neighboring the affluent areas of the primate city. This situation creates social and 
spatial exclusions that are at the basis of most of the problems in Third World mega cities.  (Fay 
2005; Davis 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2006; World Bank. Europe and Central Asia Region. 
Infrastructure Sector Unit. 2006). Unemployment and lack of basic services such as decent housing, 
health care, clean water, and sanitation often characterize primate cities and affect their population. 
National and local authorities neither have the resources nor the administrative structures to plan 
and equip the mega cities that are plagued with slums (Davis 2006) and violence (Moser and 
McIlwaine 2006). An increasing number of urban dwellers are poor, and the percentage of urban 
dwellers living below the poverty line increases with urban primacy (Fay 2005).  
Moreover, the concentration of economic activities in one or a few urban centers creates a 
polarized system that inhibits the socioeconomic development of the peripheral regions. Urban 
primacy creates gaps within the national urban system. As a result, the other urban centers are 
                                                 
4 http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-population-125.html 
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unable to play innovation diffusion and development roles over their surrounding areas (Pedersen 
1970; Brown 1981). Regional economic growth and integration are restrained (Weathon 21; 
Boudeville 1966; Coraggio 1973; Griffith 1979; Claval 1995). For instance, in his book “Paris and 
the French desert” (1947), the geographer Jean Francois Gravier (Gravier 1947) describes the 
French capital as a predator stating that: “in every aspects, the Parisian agglomeration conducted 
itself since 1850, not as a metropolis invigorating its hinterland but as a monopolizing group 
devouring all the nation’s substance” (page 74). Urban primacy has a negative effect on the overall 
socioeconomic development of a country (Moomaw and Alwosabi 2003; Moomaw and Alwosabi 
2003).  
As proof of the previous assertions, the small size of the other cities of the Haitian urban 
system as described (table 3) and the disproportionably large number of migrants moving to the 
MAPAP (table 2) illustrate the impact of the MAPAP on the other cities. In addition, my personal 
experience and the experience of childhood friends, as explained in the introduction, show the 
inability of cities outside of the primate city to retain their population. I have tested the assumptions 
that the MAPAP overshadows the regional capitals and all the other cities of the Haitian urban 
system.    
Urban Primacy and Development: from Modernization Theory to 
Dependency Theory 
The general development theories and more specifically dependency theory explain urban 
primacy in the context of the overall development process. Dependency theory is one of the main 
general development theories. The other major theories are the World System Theory, Urban Bias 
Theory and Modernization Theory that explain the spatial implications of the ties of developing 
economies to the world economy. They all point out the role in urban primacy but fail to study the 
other cities.   
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The failure of Modernization Theory as a Policy Framework  
Scholars and researchers in Latin America have developed dependency theory in opposition 
to modernization theory, one of the main development theories developed during the 1950s and 
1960s. Modernization theory explains the development process by the diffusion of the capitalist 
economic system and the integration of the national economies in the system (Rostow 1962). 
From the modernist point of view, the city is a key factor in the introduction and the 
diffusion of modernity (Hirschman, 1958). Foreign capital should be invested to promote 
industrialization in urban centers and modernize agriculture following the path of the developed 
countries.  This process increases urban growth, and urbanization is one of the principal 
characteristics of a modern, developed economy. The mechanism of development from the urban 
centers is based on the concept of natural growth poles and the central place systems. The city is 
perceived as a pole from where the development process will start (Hirschmann, 1958). It creates 
the polarization of the economic region by concentrating the resources in a single point. This 
polarization is essential in the early stage of economic development. It produces important 
economies of scale and allows for the maximum use of scarce resources. However, the impacts of 
this economic growth will induce the development of each level of the national urban system. In the 
end, the modern values will reach the lowest level of the urban system and then the rural areas. This 
process, known as the “polarization reversal” (Richardson 1977), is inevitable and spontaneous. It 
does not require any public investment. The process is automatic and linked to capitalist expansion. 
Urbanization should induce development.  
Modernization theory has shaped economic development policies in Latin America in the 
post-World War II period. External capital investments have been used to promote intensely 
industrial development (Bradshaw et al., 1991, 1991; Bornschier, 1981, Evens et al., 1980). An 
increasing part of the agriculture of the Third World is also financed by foreign investments and 
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became essentially export-oriented. However, the predicted growth and development did not occur 
at the expected level and rhythm.  Instead, in the post-colonial era, Third World countries found 
that they were trapped in a new form of dependency toward international capitalism and 
multinational corporations (Peter and Timberlake, 1980). The financiers selected the goods, both 
industrial and agricultural, depending on the demand in the international market. The decrease of 
the price of a given crop in the international market may cause the collapse of an entire economy 
(e.g., the Ivory Coast and Cacao). The Third World countries also experienced unprecedented urban 
growth. However, poverty and underdevelopment is also the main characteristic of most of these 
countries and their cities. The automatic induction of development from the urban centers did not 
happen.  
Some authors explain the limitations of the effects of modernity as a vicious cycle. Internal 
and external economies of scale will perpetuate the “initiated” polarization and unequal 
development. Therefore, the pole will attract more and more of the forces of the economy and the 
reversal effects on the countryside will remain relative (Gunnar; Myrdal 1964; Myrdal 1978; Myrdal 
1990).   
Dependency Theory, Urbanization and Urban Primacy in the Third World  
In reaction to the failure of the application of modernization theory in the developing world, 
Latin American scholars have developed dependency theory or dependencia explaining 
underdevelopment by the historical spread of capitalism. The result of the process is the enrichment 
of the center at the detriment of the periphery (Cardoso and Faletto, 1971). In this global process, 
the periphery is the Third World.  
While traditional scholars explain capitalist expansion by external, global forces, Cardoso and 
Faletto (1971) adopted an innovative historical structural approach integrating both external and 
internal forces. The forces are not only economic but political and social as well. Fernando Henrique 
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Cardoso and Enzo Feletto in their book “Dependency and Development in Latin America” (1979) 
argue that dependency is not only due to external factors. It had been established and perpetrated 
because there is a coincidence between the capitalistic values and the economic interests of national 
dominating classes. They adopted a historical-structural approach to explore the social process that 
instituted but also perpetrated inequalities between center and periphery and among the diverse 
social groups in the periphery. They explore the relationships between external and internal factors / 
actors and the social forces toward changes or self-perpetuation. They concluded that the different 
forms of national dependency can be explained by the interactions between all the actors.    
Some scholars have explained urban primacy in Third World countries by citing the 
dependent nature of their economies (Cardoso 1971; Evens 1980; Bornschier 1981; Bradshaw 1991). 
The cash-crop agriculture of the Third World is increasingly export-oriented and is produced for the 
international market. This strategy is encouraged by international financial institutions to help poor 
countries acquire the hard currency necessary to pay their debts (Ridell Jul-97). However, the 
countries are using their land to produce staples for the external market instead of producing goods 
for internal consumption. In return, they rely on the international markets for basic goods such as 
alimentary products. These two factors combined create increased economic activity in the cities, 
specifically those with international port facilities. International port facilities require large public 
investments and the governments, because of their limited resources, often select one or a few cities 
for this purpose, increasing their attraction over the other cities in the urban system and favoring 
urban primacy.  
 Third World governments are also encouraged, specifically by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), to promote industrial 
development. Industrial development is also dependent and creates urban primacy (Todaro 1977; 
Bornschier 1981). The capital that is invested is mostly foreign and the production is for the 
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international market. These policies find an echo in national economic groups eager to benefit from 
the advantages of a global economy (Cardoso 1971). The implementation of industrial activities and 
the exportation of production require important investments in infrastructure such as port facilities, 
roads, electricity, and water. Again, the governments, because of their limited resources, often select 
one or a few cities, increasing their attraction over the other cities in the urban system and favoring 
urban primacy. 
Dependency Theory and Regional Urban Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean  
However, recent studies have shown a decrease in urban primacy in three Latin American 
countries and five Caribbean countries, including Haiti (Portes 1989; Portes 1994). They show that 
these changes in the urbanization process are due to profound transformations induced by the 
economic crisis of recent years and seem to reflect the rapid adjustment of Latin American countries 
to the debt-induced economic crisis. The decrease in urban primacy was observed in countries that 
have developed export-production zones and export-assembly plants in the search for new sources 
of foreign exchange. However, this is not sufficient to explain the decrease of the primate cities. 
Three additional factors need to be considered: the locations of export zones, their relative viability, 
and the growth of other foreign-oriented sectors such as tourism and agriculture. Rondinelli (1983) 
has identified the same factors to explain the dynamic of growth of secondary cities in developing 
countries. Dependency alone does not explain the level of urban primacy: national and regional 
factors should also be integrated in the explanation. Moreover, the same factors that explain urban 
primacy also explain the growth of other cities within the urban system. The assumption is that cities 
with stronger ties with the international market will grow faster than the other cities. These last 
findings require further research, this assumptions is tested in the present study filling a gap in the 
literature. 
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There are four principal measure of economic dependency is measure mainly have been 
tested and widely accepted (Van Rossem 1996): three measures of market dependency and one 
measure of investment dependency. 
 Trade market dependency indexes measure the extent of exposure of the economy to the 
international market. There are three:  
• Trade market dependency: is the ratio of the total foreign trades to GDP. Trade market 
dependency is conceptualized by the ratio of foreign trade to the GDP. It measures the 
exposure of a country to the global economy. An economy is trade dependent if the total 
of foreign trade represents at least 1 % of its GDP. Rossem suggested this cutting point 
because “1% of the GDP is substantial”. The loss of these revenues can have damaging 
impacts on the economy with major consequences for employment and other related 
sectors of the economy.   
• Trade partner concentration: measure the percentage of export  - import with each trade 
partner. Having a few trade partners puts peripheral economies in a dependent situation 
toward the demands on the partners national market. A decrease of the demand can 
result in enormous difficulty to sell the production or the necessity to sell at a lower 
price.  
• The trade concentration measure the percentages of export - import with each trade 
partner.  
• Trade composition index: extend to which a country import raw and manufacturing 
products. The measures used here is the percentages of raw and manufactured goods in 
the total of the exports.    
 The investment dependency index assesses the extent to which is dependent on foreign 
investments. The measure used is the ratio of net foreign investment to GDP.  
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 The data to compute some these indexes are available at the national level but not at the sub-
national level in Haiti. The only data pertaining to international trade available are the import taxes. 
The import taxes are used as a proxy to measure the level of dependency of the economy of the 
regional capitals toward the international market.  
 
Dependency, Urban Primacy and Urban System in Haiti: an 
Historical Overview 
In Haiti, today’s urban primacy level, location and size of the regional capitals find their 
roots in the country’s urban history and the linking of the Haitian economy with the international 
market. The colonial period (1492–1804) marks the establishment of an urban system with the main 
purpose of exploiting the resources of the colony for the benefit of the colonial power. During the 
French colonial period, industrial development was almost entirely limited to producing sugar from 
sugarcane. The entire production was shipped to France and Europe. The economy of Saint 
Domingue was completely dependent of the international market.   
As a result, the urban network of Hispaniola (and later Saint Domingue) was composed of 
small inland urban centers and a more developed network of port cities. The inland urban centers 
served as concentration/transit points for the exportation of agricultural products. They were mainly 
established in the heart of the most productive regions. The coastal urban centers mainly served as 
gateways for raw products (gold, coffee, sugarcane) from the hinterland to the colonial metropolis. 
The smallest coastal cities were linked by coastal trade to the most important cities, from which 
goods were imported and exported between Saint Domingue and Spain and later France (Geggus 
1990; Knight 1991).  
In addition, Haiti was a typical exploitation colony ruled by the “predominantly 
monopolistic” French colonial policy (Knight 1991) that limited administrative and political local 
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power (Cardoso 1971). Therefore, the administrative and political status did require any important 
administrative centers and did not induce any major urban growth. As a result, the towns of 
eighteenth-century Saint Domingue surprised the visitors by “their extremely small size relative to 
the volume of trade that they handled even by the standard of colonial plantation societies” (Geggus 
1990).  All of today’s regional capitals are former colonial main port cities, except for Hinche. The 
location of the main cities illustrates the role of economic dependency they have played in the shape 
of Saint Domingue’s urban system.  
In the early national period, the new country sought to replace the former colony on the 
international market by producing the same agricultural goods but the new administrative structures 
and the end of slavery introduced some important changes in the urban system. They adopted the 
colonial economic policy maintaining the dependency of the Haitian economy toward the 
international market. The colonial urban system kept its economic functions as concentration points 
and gateways for the exportation of agricultural goods (Renaud 1934; Madiou 1947/1948; James 
1949; Moral 1961; Thebaud 1967; Gaillard-Pourchet 1990).  
The new leaders also established political and administrative structures that reinforced the 
existing urban centers and favored the rise of new ones. The existing urban centers became the sites 
for the political and administrative powers of the new rulers, where they established the principal 
organs of control and local political (Madiou 1947/1948; Gaillard-Pourchet 1990). This induced the 
growth of the main urban centers. 
 Finally, the end of slavery introduced changes in the urban landscape. The newly freed 
slaves left the former plantations to migrate to the cities and towns and establish new 
agglomerations and communities. The end of slavery also boosted the growth of the main urban 
centers.  
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The American occupation marked another turning point in the level of dependency of the 
Haitian economy and in the shape of the Haitian urban system and more importantly the raise of 
Port au Prince as a primate city. The occupation introduced important changes to the economy, the 
administration, and the transportation system. The occupant imposed a series of reforms allowing 
and reinforcing American investments in the national economy in diverse sectors such as agriculture 
and transportation (Doura 2001). The constitution had been mandated to allow foreigners to own 
lands, inducing the injection of foreign capital in the country. Other laws allowed the expropriation 
of the farmers to reinstate the big plantations controlled by foreign investors, such as the contractor 
Donald McDonald (Doura 2001). The flow of foreign investments touched other sectors such as 
mining (e.g., copper, bauxite) or subcontracts in clothing, sport equipments, or telecommunication 
(Turnier 1955; Pierre Charles 1967). The investments in agriculture and the expropriations deprived 
small farmers of their land and forced more of them to migrate to the urban centers, where limited 
investments had been made in urban economic activities. The American occupation of Haiti re-
enforced the dependency of the Haitian economy toward the international market.  
 Another consequence of the American occupation of Haiti is the rise of the capital to the 
rank of primate city. The investments had been almost exclusively made in Port-au-Prince. The 
economic changes increased urban-rural migration toward the main urban centers, but mostly 
towards Port-au-Prince. The occupation force established administrative structures to ensure the 
overall control of the economy and maintain political stability. To do so, it reinforced the central 
administrative power and weakened the local institutions; it also made changes in the existing 
infrastructure to support its policy. For example, it closed some of the regional ports and built roads 
linking the main regional cities to Port-au-Prince (C.E.G.E.T. 1985). The main regional urban cities 
lost a progressively larger part of their economic power and resources, to the benefit of Port-au-
Prince. The American occupation of Haiti played a determining role in the structure of the actual 
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urban system, characterized by the primacy of the capital (Corvington 1991). The primacy of Port au 
Prince is one of the consequences of the dependency of the Haitian economy under the American 
occupation (Cardoso 1971; Evens 1980; Bornschier 1981; Bradshaw 1991).  
After the U.S. occupation the successive Haitian governments, because of their limited 
resources and the desire to control all aspects of the country’s political life, kept the same politico-
administrative structure and infrastructure. This once again increased the dependency of the Haitian 
economy and contributed to the growth of Port au Prince to the rank of a primate city. 
The Failure of Decentralization and Regional 
Development Policies in the Third World and in Haiti 
The negative impacts of urban primacy on development have become a major concern for 
development planners in Third World countries and in Haiti. This concern has created the 
emergence of dual function development policies that aimed to improve sectors of the economy and 
social services (health or education) while at the same time integrating geographic dimensions into 
the policies (Rondinelli 1983; Doan 1995; Glaeser 1999; Bardhan Automn 2002). At the same time, 
decentralization policies have become increasingly popular in matters of governance all around the 
world and in Third World countries in particular (Olowu 2001; Bardhan Automn 2002).  
Definition of Decentralization 
There are several definitions of decentralization. One of the best general definitions is 
provided by Rondinelli, et al.: “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and 
resource-raising and allocation from the central government to (a) field units of central government 
ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels of government; (c) semi-autonomous public 
authorities or corporations; (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) NGOs/PVOs.” 
(Rondinelli 1981). In addition, Wolman (in Bennet, 1990) identifies types of decentralization: political 
decentralization, administrative decentralization, and economic decentralization. For the purposes of the study, 
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the concern is economic decentralization. Political and administrative decentralizations are not 
successfully being applied in Haiti and are at the forefront of the debate surrounding 
decentralization. Economic decentralization is put on the back burner, but as the literature review 
will show, economic decentralization is necessary for the successful implementation of political and 
administrative decentralizations.  
Decentralization, Democracy and Poverty Reduction in the 
Developing World 
Decentralization has been experimented with throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
(Rondinelli 1983; Burki 1999; World-Bank 2000). 5 The enthusiasm for decentralization found its 
roots in the continued failure of centralized states to induce development and reduce poverty 
because of corruption and the heaviness of the administrative structure. Decentralization works to 
fragment and reduce the authority of the central government by transferring some of it to local 
institutions that are administrated by locally elected officials. This new framework of power should 
make local governments closer to their constituency and more accountable in the delivery of public 
services. Progress in technology should also make it easier to locally manage services such as 
electricity or communication. Finally, the smaller size of the territory to manage requires smaller, and 
therefore more efficient, administrative structures (Wolcott 1994; Asthana 2003; Andrianova 2004; 
Fjeldstad 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006).  Decentralization should reduce poverty in 
developing countries by improving governance and accountability (Loquai, Bah et al. 2001; Crook 
2003; Schneider and University of Sussex. Institute of Development Studies. 2003)). 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Decentralization has several definitions and can take different forms. In this study, I refer to the “devolution of political decision making to local level 
smaller entities” (Bardhan, p.186) 
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The Need for Economic Decentralization and the Role of Secondary 
Cities 
However, in spite of its promises, decentralization policies have so far failed to deliver 
tangible spatial and governance results: both urban primacy and poverty are increasing in most 
developing countries. Central governments do not have the capacity (or sometimes the political will) 
to implement decentralization, and the local administrations do not have the sustainable capacity to 
undertake the new responsibilities that come with decentralization.  
Some scholars explain the failures of decentralization by citing the lack by the lack of 
economic decentralization policy and more specifically the lack of secondary cities, which are cities 
that are large enough to perform important economic and social functions for their own populations 
and those in surrounding areas (Rondinelli 1983). In other words, a city that will be able to diffuse 
development at a regional level, attract and retain rural migrants, and slow the growth of the primate 
city. Secondary cities are crucial to the development of developing countries because of the roles 
that they can play, such as reducing urban concentration, reversing polarization, alleviating problems 
in larger cities, reducing regional inequities, stimulating rural economies, reducing urban poverty, and 
increasing productivity (Rondinelli 1983). Secondary cities are therefore crucial to slowing the 
growth of primate cities and reducing poverty in rural areas. Decentralization policies may fail 
because of the lack of secondary cities that can support economic activities requiring high 
population thresholds and extensive services and facilities (Rondinelli 1983). The present study has 
identified, among the regional capitals, the secondary cities or regional growth poles that need to be 
re-enforced in order to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process in Haiti.  
 
The consequences of the primacy of the national capital Port au Prince over the national 
economy has become a major concern for the Haitian government since 1986. Before 1986, the 
Duvalier dictatorship wanted to control all aspects of the national life by maintaining a strong and 
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highly centralized government and by concentrating all the socio-economic activities in the capital 
Port au Prince. Since the end of the Duvaliers’ regime in 1986, there have been several policy efforts 
to address them including the insertion of decentralization as one of the most important innovations 
of the 1987 Haitian constitution. This innovation in the constitution aimed at decentralizing the 
central government and to give more power to existing and newly created sub-national institutions.  
In addition, there have been several attempts to reopen some of the regional ports to 
international trade. These efforts were aimed at diverting trade traffic away from the port of Port-au-
Prince and decreasing congestion in the port. They have been successful in some places and 
unsuccessful in others. For instance, the ports of Cap Haïtien, Saint Marc, Jacmel, and Miragoane 
were rehabilitated for that purpose. These attempts were parts of ongoing efforts to address the 
consequences of the primacy of Port au Prince and to implement a broader decentralization policy 
by encouraging the delocalization of economic activities outside of the MAPAP. However, much 
remains to be done to halt the growth of the MAPAP.   
Like in Haiti, decentralization policies have been implemented in the Third World in part to 
address the consequences of urban primacy. The assessment of the outcomes of decentralization 
policies in Third World countries has given birth to a flourishing literature. Most research focuses on 
administrative performance in resource management and service delivery in the areas of education, 
water and sanitation or health care for instance (Ferrer, Alvarez et al. 2002; Asthana 2003; Larson 
2003; Mønnesland 2003; PAD 2003). Unfortunately, the research / evaluation focuses on how the 
policy as a whole is carried out by the central government and not on the performance of specific 
local collectivities. In addition, when such studies are conducted, it is to assess the performance of 
the particular local entities being studied and not to, eventually, draw conclusions between their 
characteristics (population size, economic potentials, and so on) and the outcomes of 
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decentralization. More importantly, decentralization outcomes have very rarely been studied from a 
geographic standpoint with an emphasis on the urban system.  
The focus on local governance and the performance of local institutions is unfortunately also 
predominant in the design phase of decentralization policies. The idea is also that in order to 
promote democracy all citizens, all the local institutions should be treated equally and should be 
awarded the same rights and powers (Fukasaku, Hausmann et al. 1998; Aspinall, Fealy et al. 2003; 
Tvedten and Orre 2003; Jütting 2005).  Therefore, there would often be little differentiation in status 
based on fundamental differences in terms of wealth or real institutional capacity to promote local 
development. The policies and literature surrounding them mainly focus on political and 
administrative decentralizations.  
However, as Rodinelli (1983) points out so clearly, to achieve the other goals of 
decentralization, to promote development and reduce urban primacy, it is necessary to enable the 
other cities to play a more active role in the economy; it is necessary to promote an urban policy that 
will decrease the attraction of the primate city and increase the attraction of other cities in the system 
(Bodineau 1995). In other worlds, economic decentralization is necessary to achieve political and 
administrative decentralization. The development of smaller towns and cities stimulates rural 
development by creating closer markets for primary staples (Bos 1965; Boudeville 1966; Boventer 
1970). The dispersion of economic activities lowers the cost of products and the transfer of 
innovative values from the cities to the countryside (Brown 1981). More importantly, the 
development of secondary cities should be integrated into the policy design, considering the role 
that they can play in increasing the chances of success of decentralization in Third World countries. 
Finally, cities and more specifically secondary cities in developing countries concentrate an 
important part of the national economic activities and the population. These economic and 
demographic characteristics of cities make it easy to raise sufficient local taxes (that are already raised 
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by the central government) to carry out the new responsibilities of local institutions. Insufficient 
potential local taxes are often one of the main obstacles to decentralization (Fukasaku, Hausmann et 
al. 1998; Aspinall, Fealy et al. 2003; Tvedten and Orre 2003; Jütting 2005)   
This study will formulate policy recommendations to support Haiti’s efforts to implement 
decentralization by focusing on the deconcentration of socioeconomic activities outside of the 
Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince (MAPAP). Strengthening of institutions alone is not sufficient 
to ensure the success of the process. The existing literature on the decentralization process in Haiti 
does not explore the wide range of possible explanations for the failure of the current 
decentralization policy in Haiti and elsewhere. Additional explanations can be found in the fields of 
regional and urban economies and general development.  
Indeed, the lack of spatial economic policy to support decentralization can limit the impact 
of the administrative measures enacted to improve local governance. Economic growth determines, 
to a large extent, administrative capacities (Rondinelli 1983). Economic growth requires investments 
that investors will seek to protect by participating in the local political life; it also requires skilled 
human resources that will be likely to engage in local political activities. Therefore, economic growth 
may provide the regions with qualified public servants. Moreover, economic growth increases local 
fiscal assets and therefore, potential public investments in services and infrastructures. This study 
has explored additional venues to explain the failure of the ongoing decentralization process and 
offer the elements to design the spatial economic policy to support it and increase its chances of 
success.  
Spatial economic policies rely on the framework of the growth pole theory for their design 
and evaluation. However, the application of the growth pole theory as a policy framework or to 
evaluate decentralization and regional planning policies in the Third World has not been very 
successful as described in the previous chapter. One of the reasons is the lack of data. This research 
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takes advantage of a rare opportunity to test the growth pole theory in a Third World country. Very 
often, the lack of data is the main obstacle to conducting research in the field of regional study in 
developing countries (Rondinelli 1983). Fortunately, Haiti conducted its last census in 2003, more 
than twenty years after the previous one. The Haitian Census Bureau made it its priority to collect a 
very detailed set of information and to use the latest technologies available and usable in the Haitian 
context. All the data collected is today in a computer database and technicians can run requests and 
produce specific sub-datasets, like the one used for this study. Such detailed information is rarely 
available in the developing world. This offers a unique opportunity to conduct research in urban and 
regional studies and to realistically test the growth pole theory in a developing country. This study 
will bring important missing elements to the field of regional studies in the Third World.   
Growth Pole Theory and its Application as a Policy 
Framework in the Third World  
This chapter presents the application of the growth pole theory in the Third World on which 
the identification of regional development poles relies. Regional development poles are usually cities 
that are targeted to receive public and private investments in order to create jobs and socioeconomic 
activities that will attract people who would otherwise migrate to the primate city. In this sense, the 
regional development poles are designed to decrease the growth of the primate city.  
The Growth Pole Theory 
Perroux first introduced the notion of economic growth poles (Perroux 1955). Perroux 
argued that a group of industries around a leading propulsive industry will innovate and grow faster 
than those outside the group or pole. The propulsive industry will use inputs from smaller industries 
or raw materials from the primary sector, boosting inter-economic activities and innovation rates to 
meet its evolving needs and expansion. The concept of “dominance” was important in the context 
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of economic growth pole. The flow of goods and services from the dominant, firm X to Y is a 
greater proportion of X's output than the flow from Y to X is of Y's output.  
This notion was later transferred to geographical space and broadened to include the 
concentration of population and economic activities and named “growth pole”. Growth pole theory 
is based on the work of Losch (Losch 1954; Christaller 1966; Von Thunen 1966). Chistaller and Von 
Thunen have discussed how urban centers dominate and organize their surrounding area. The level 
of domination and the effectiveness of such organization depend on the urban center’s position in a 
hierarchical scheme. The larger an urban center is, the larger and better organized its dominating 
territory will be. Von Thunen (1966) studied the influence of cities on the spatial organization of 
agricultural production in Germany.  
Several dependant industries might be geographically regrouped around the propulsive 
industry, creating a polarized region around a regional (or growth) pole. A polarized region is 
defined as a heterogeneous, continuous area localized in geographical space, centered around a 
regional center of gravity and whose different parts are interdependent through mutual 
complementary relation (Richardson 1975).  
A regional pole is a set of expanding industries located in an urban area that induces the 
development of economic activities throughout its zone of influence. The attraction power of a 
pole increases with its size, and its effect decreases with distance; isolated industries will struggle 
to grow. There is a push and pull factor that comes into play where the larger urban centers have 
a stronger attraction power than the smaller cities. The larger cities also have a stronger ability to 
retain their own population (Boudeville 1966). The assumptions of the effects of the size of the 
poles, the size of the other cities in their regions, and the distance between the poles and the 
other cities in their regions are tested in this study.  
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The factors that explain a pole are not only economic but institutional and social, and the 
effects of a pole have the same dimensions: “The growth pole is a set that has the capacity to induce 
growth of another set (growth being defined as a lasting increase in the dimensional indicator); the 
pole of development is one that has the capacity to engender economic and social structures whose 
effects are to increase the complexity of the whole and increase its multi-dimensional return” 
(Perroux 1988, page 49).  Myrdal explains the overall development of the pole and its region by the 
“cumulative causation” by which a change in a social system will “not call forth countervailing 
changes but, instead, supporting changes which move the system in the same direction as the first 
change but much further” (1957, p. 13).  The development of a growth pole should induce not only 
economic growth but the overall socioeconomic development (Hirschmann 1958).  
In the case of this study, the analysis is extended to migration between the regional capitals 
(the poles) and the other cities of their respective regions. The attraction power of a pole over its 
region is measured by the number and percentage of migrants received. The strongest poles are 
identified as the urban centers receiving the most migrants from a defined geographic entity. The 
strongest poles also attract migrants even from the other large cities of their regions and from cities 
that are far away. These assumptions and hypothesis are tested in this study. 
Migration is a good proxy to study attraction power and the potential for economic growth. 
Migrants are attracted by wage differentials between their place of origin and their destination. 
However, unemployment rates are very high in cities across the country and wages are sometimes 
lower than in rural areas. Expected wages differentials explain the increase in migration to urban 
centers. (Todaro 1970; Todaro March 1969). Above all, migrants hope not only to find better paid 
employment in the formal sector but also to take advantage of all the economic opportunities in the 
informal sector and services, retail activities for a growing population as well as subcontractors for 
larger enterprises in the formal sector (Andrei 1982; Andrei Rogers 1982; IHSI 2001). The 
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destination is the city with the most potential to fulfill the migrants’ dreams. Migration is therefore a 
good proxy to study the attraction power of potential growth poles.     
The Application of the Growth Pole Theory as a Policy Framework 
in the Third World and in Haiti 
Growth pole theory not only explains the existing poles but also opens the doors for its 
applications in formulating regional policy. Regional and urban planners started to use growth pole 
theory in order to design spatial economic policies to reduce the growth of primate cities by 
stimulating regional poles (Richardson 1975). Unfortunately, the strict application of the geographic 
assumptions of growth pole theory in Third World countries did not produce the expected results. 
Indeed, instead of promoting regional development, regional planned or natural poles tend to 
function like enclaves. The main causes identified are the high concentration of economic activities 
and administrative and managerial resources in primate cities, which is very difficult to reverse; the 
geographic isolation of the potential growth poles in their regions; the weaknesses of the policies; 
regime changes; and the lack of political will (Jefferson 1939; Linsky 1965; Coraggio 1972; Coraggio 
1973).  
Additional explanations of the failure of the application of the growth pole theory in 
developing countries are provided by comparing the urbanization process in the First World to that 
of the Third World. The theory was originally formulated in the European context, which is 
completely different from that of today’s Third World countries. Indeed, in Europe, urbanization 
was the combined product of agricultural modernization and industrialization. In the developing 
countries, a combination of overpopulation, of poverty and persistence of traditional agriculture in 
the rural area and limited industrial development explains urban growth. Moreover, the relationship 
between the different sectors of the economy is also different. While in the First World the primary 
sector produced raw material for the development of industrial activities, the primary sector of 
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industry in the Third World (mainly agriculture) produces raw materials almost exclusively for the 
external market. The raw materials produced are not used to develop industrial activities and 
produce value-added goods.  
Above all, it is very difficult to accurately assess the uses of growth pole theory as a planning 
strategy in the Third World because an important part of the results can be explained by factors that 
are external to the theory itself, such as the policy implementation process. It is also difficult to test 
the assumptions of the theory in Third World countries because of the lack of detailed data. More 
research needs to be conducted to fairly assess the growth pole theory as a policy framework in the 
Third World context. The present study has filled part of this gap in the literature.  
The spatial assumptions of growth pole theory are based on the linkage between rural and 
urban economies; this linkage supports the process through which urban centers will propel 
development in their hinterland and where urban centers will grow based on the wealth of their 
hinterland. Unfortunately, this linkage is broken in developing countries because the international 
market plays a key role in Third World countries’ economic activities. 
There is no existing study of the Haitian urban system or about the test or application of 
growth pole theory. The latest government national development program does not have a 
comprehensive approach to address the problems raised by the high level of primacy of the 
MAPAP.  In 2007, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation published the National 
Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction Document (NSGPRD) for 2008 – 2010. This document 
presents the government’s and other stakeholders’ proposed interventions in the country for this 
period. It was elaborated based on a participative approach promoted by the World Bank in 
developing countries. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) usually provides the 
necessary technical assistance as it was the case in Haiti (MPCE November 2007).  
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Although urban development is mentioned several times in the document, there is no overall 
urban development program/activities that will address the problems raised by this study. The first 
mention of urbanization appears on page 92 under the section “Specific cross-sector and transversal 
policies,” ”Environment and sustainable development” in the chapter named “The poor and out-of-control 
urbanization.” The section deals mainly with favoring urbanization outside of environmentally 
sensible areas like swamps, river basins or steep slopes.   
The second mention appears under the chapter “State Capacity building” in the section 
“Decentralization” on page 98. The activities mainly focus on the training of the local elected 
officials and the staff of the local collectivities, reforming the legal framework, advocacy to explain 
the advantages and challenges of decentralization and, capacity building.  
Urban development re-appears on page 100 as a section in the chapter “Specific cross-sector 
and transversal policies.” This section focuses on how to restore order in the poor neighborhoods 
by rebuilding the physical environment, creating jobs, re-establishing the presence of the local and 
central authorities, increasing the capacity of the local authorities in terms of slum management and 
promoting participative neighborhood planning. Finally, the section “Land Management” of the 
chapter “Specific cross-sector and transversal policies” aims at promoting relationship between the 
urban and rural areas at the regional, arrondissement and communal levels.  
These proposed actions do not address the problems raised by this study, mainly how to 
slow the growth of the MAPAP and build a balanced urban system. The present study provides the 
rational for including a more integrated urban development strategy approach at the national level.  
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Research Design  
General Considerations  
One of the objectives of the study is to identify potential growth poles among the regional 
capitals. The poles should be reinforced with important public investments in infrastructure that will 
make them as attractive to private investors than MAPAP. In addition, private investments should 
be promoted by measures such as tax exemptions or other financial incentives.  
I wanted to focus on decentralization at the national level and draw comparisons and 
conclusions that will provide me with the elements to formulate policy recommendations that will 
promote economic decentralization and halt the growth of MAPAP. In a developing country like 
Haiti, consistent data collection is not a priority and there are very few complete sets of data on the 
eight regional capitals. Because of these considerations, I have primarily used data that are available 
for the eight regional capitals, while other data are used to explain the results and findings.  
The Case Study Design 
To conduct this research, I have used the case study design, Haiti being the case. The 
research has several characteristics that justify this choice. Urban growth in the context of regional 
migration and economic dependency is a complex, contemporary phenomenon in which the 
boundaries among the different factors are not always clear (Yin 2003). For instance, the location of 
a city in a region with export-oriented agricultural activity will not induce population growth if this 
city is not a port-city (public or private investments) or if it is not at a crossroad of the 
transportation of the goods to their gateway.  
The topic to be investigated and the theoretical framework to be used are complex and 
require a flexible strategy to integrate several scientific fields and a variety of types and sources of 
data. Assessing the role of the departmental capitals in their regions requires elements and 
techniques from geography, economics, and demography. I also use qualitative, quantitative, and 
geographic data from all these disciplines. The case study strategy gives the flexibility to navigate 
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among different tools, techniques, and data in a mixed methodology approach (Singleton 1998; 
Creswell 2003; Yin 2003). 
The research is an explanatory case study in the sense that the objective is to understand how 
the different factors explain population growth in the units of analysis. At the same time, the factors 
cannot be manipulated, which makes an experiment impossible to conduct in this context (Yin 
2003).  
Haiti, the case, is not meant to be representative of the Third World; rather the growth pole 
and dependency theories are used as templates to understand the population growth in the units of 
analysis, the regional capitals. The findings of the study will serve as an empirical test of the theory 
and will lead to “analytical generalization” of the theoretical propositions and hypotheses (Yin 2003).  
Units of Analysis 
Units of analysis are the primary entity to be studied. They can be an individual, an event, or 
an entity. In a case study design, the “definition of the unit of analysis (…) is related to the way the 
initial research questions have been defined” (Yin 1994). In addition, there are many ways to select 
the units of analysis in the field of regional study. The parameters vary from political, administrative, 
economic or military functions to demographic characteristics (Ullman 1941; Boventer 1970; 
Coraggio 1973; Richardson 1975; Rondinelli 1983). In our case, the criterion is administrative. The 
primary units of analysis are: Gonaives, Cap Haïtien, Port de Paix, Fort Liberté, Hinche, Jacmel, Les 
Cayes, and Jérémie (map 2). They are the regional capitals of Haiti and as such, have a leadership 
role to play in promoting the development of their respective region and share common political 
and administrative characteristics. The selection of the regional capitals as primary units of analysis is 
related to the main objective of the study, which is to identify and explain growth poles/secondary 
cities in Haiti.   
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The following map shows the boundaries of the nine departments of Haiti and the location 
of the capitals. Only eight departments and their capitals, the potential regional poles, are studied in 
this research. The capital of the West department is Port-au-Prince, the national capital, which along 
with its surrounding cities forms MAPAP, the primate city (Map 2). 
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Map 2: The departments of Haiti and their capitals  
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The regional capitals are different in terms of demographic characteristics (table 4, 
appendixes 1 and 2). The populations of the capitals vary, from 16,625 inhabitants for the city of 
Fort Liberté in the North East, to 204,058 for Cap Haïtien in the North. The average population of 
83,176 and the standard deviation of 63,911 show important variations in the size of the cities. The 
urban populations of the departments show the same disparities: it varies from 59,642 for South 
East to 626,928 for Grande Anse. The sizes of the regional capitals and of the urban population are 
determining factors in the attraction power of a city. Consequently, these disparities in population 
should result in disparities in the attraction power and migration patterns. 
Table 4: Urban and rural populations of the eight departments and the population of their capitals  
 
Department Total population Rural population  Urban population  Capital  Capital Population 
North 823,043 497,725 325,318 Cap-Haïtien 204,058 
North East 308,385 190,513 117,872 Fort-Liberté 16,625 
South East 484,675 425,033 59,642 Jacmel 30,183 
Center 581,505 486,886 94,619 Hinche 24,131 
Grande Anse 522,153 104,775 626,928 Jérémie 103,889 
North West  531,198 412,400 118,798 Port-de-Paix 70,742 
South 621,651 512,028 109,623 Les Cayes 55,276 
Artibonite 1,299,398 876,922 422,476 Gonaïves 160,501 
Minimum 308,385 104,775 59,642   16,625 
Maximum 1,299,398 876,922 626,928   204,058 
Average 646,501 438,285 234,410   83,176 
Standard 
deviation  280,969 217,141 190,495   63,911 
Source : IHSI–RGPH –2003 
 
The Data 
This study will rely on different types and sources of secondary data that are both 
quantitative and qualitative. I have primarily used data that are available for all the units of analysis. 
This approach was necessary to be able to compare the results and draw conclusions that are 
essential to formulating recommendations to implement economic decentralization. For each type of 
data, I have presented the rationale behind the choice as well as the limitations of using such data. 
The data are processed to conduct statistical analysis and test the research questions and hypothesis.  
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Rarely Available Census Data  
The 2003 Census Data 
New census data are rarely available in a developing country like Haiti. In 2003, Haiti held its 
first census in 20 years. During the 2003 Census, the Haitian Institute of Statistics and Computer 
Science (IHSI) sent interviewers all over the country with questionnaires to be completed for each 
dwelling unit. Among the questions, the interviewers asked each person in the dwelling unit their 
birthplace and whether or not it is in a rural or urban area. People whose birthplace is different from 
their place of residence are considered migrants for the purpose of this study.  
IHSI created a matrix for each department that provides, for each commune, the total 
population, number of natives (persons whose birthplace is the same as the place of residence), and 
number of migrants (persons whose birthplace is different from the place of residence). For the 
number of migrants born in another commune of the same department, the matrix gives the name 
of the birth commune and states whether it is an urban or rural area (table 5). For the purpose of 
this study, I am going to use the number of migrants from one city to another (persons born in an a 
city and living in a different city); I will refer to these numbers as “urban-to-urban migrants.” I will 
use primarily the number of urban-to-urban migrants between each unit of analysis (the regional 
capitals of the eight departments of the country – except for the department of the West where 
MAPAP is located) and the cities of their respective departments. I will use the other data to 
support, illustrate and re-enforce my findings.  
Table 5: Matrix of migration data from the same department 
 
Birthplace 
Commune 1 Commune 2 Commune 3 Commune 3 Commune N Residence place 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Commune 1 
          
Urban 
          
Rural 
          
Commune 2 
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Urban 
          
Rural           
Commune N            
 
Relevance of Demographic and Migration Data  
Demographic and migration data are very relevant for studying and identifying development 
poles in Third World countries. Natural growth alone cannot account for the rapid urban population 
growth. Natural population growth in an urban setting is lower since fertility rates are lower than 
those in rural areas: rural dwellers tend to be more educated, modern and to have less children than 
their rural counterparts. Therefore, migration plays an important role in urban population growth in 
developing countries. However, migrants are mainly young adults at the peak of their fertility who 
are most likely to have children, which should also contribute to urban growth. In this sense, 
migration contributes in two different ways to urban growth (Todaro 1979). 
Migration is also a good proxy to study attraction power and the potential for economic 
growth. Migrants are attracted by wage differentials between their place of origin and their 
destination. However, unemployment rates are very high in cities across the country and wages are 
sometimes lower than in rural areas. Expected wages differentials explain the increase in migration to 
urban centers. (Todaro 1970; Todaro March 1969). Above all, migrants hope not only to find better 
paid employment in the formal sector but also to take advantage of all the economic opportunities 
in the informal sector and services, retail activities for a growing population as well as subcontractors 
for larger enterprises in the formal sector (Andrei 1982; Andrei Rogers 1982; IHSI 2001). The 
destination is the city with the most potential to fulfill the migrants’ dreams. Migration is therefore a 
good proxy to identify potential growth poles.     
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Limitations of the Census Data  
 
Unfortunately there are no data on the number of people who migrate from one regional 
capital to another. This information would have been useful to measure the ability of the capitals to 
retain their migrants or natives or their ability to attract migrants from the other capitals; in other 
words, the competitiveness within the national urban system. However, one can still know, for each 
city, the number of total migrants from every other department (table 6). 
Table 6: Matrix of migration data from the other departments and overseas 
 
Birthplace  
Residence place Department of 
West 
Department of 
North 
Department of 
N1 
Department of 
N2 
Foreign 
Commune 1 
     
Urban 
     
Rural 
     
Commune 2 
     
Urban 
     
Rural 
     
 
Finally, the data do not include the temporal aspect of migration, i.e., date of migration. This 
information would have allowed me to analyze trends in migration patterns over the course of 
several years. Instead, the data provide just a “snapshot” for the year 2003, which still provides a 
good proxy of migration trends.  
Geographic Data 
The geographic data include numeric data (the distances between cities) and vector spatial 
data such as land use, topography, hydrology, and road maps. In addition, the census data described 
above are integrated in a geographic information system (GIS) and linked to geographic features 
such as the cities’ location. The numeric data are used to study the effect of distance on the number 
of migrants.  
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Economic Data 
I will use quantitative and qualitative secondary economic data. A first set of data is the 
value, in gourdes (the Haitian currency), of import taxes collected at each of the tax collection 
points in the country. Data pertaining to exports do not exist because Haiti does not collect taxes on 
exports as part of the requirement of the Structural Adjustment Program mandated by IMF. These 
data are used to assess the impact of the international market on these cities and are published by 
the Ministry of Finances (table 12). 
The amount of import taxes collected at each tax collection point reflects the volume of 
international trade handled. A greater level of import taxes is a sign of stronger ties with the 
international market. These data are used to test the assumptions of dependency theory that cities 
with stronger ties with the international market tends to attract more migrants.  
Data regarding the total value of goods imported–exported are only available at the national 
level and not by trade locations. Data on the private sector/employment for all the regional capitals 
are not available in a country where 68% of non-agricultural activities function in the informal 
sector. However, for the fiscal year of 2008–2009, for example, the Haitian GDP was 14,015 million 
gourdes while the value of imports was 18,317; the value of exports was 4,312 million gourdes (BRH 
2010). These data show that Haiti imports more goods than it produces and that the value of 
exports is minimal compared to the value of imports. Data on imports provide a good estimation of 
international trade activities in the regional capitals.  
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Research Questions, Hypothesis, and Data Processing 
The main objectives of the study are: 
 To identify among the regional capitals the cities that have the characteristics to be 
potential “growth poles” or “secondary cities.”  
 To explain how these cities differ from the other regional capitals and from the other 
cities (except the cities of the MAPAP).  
 To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in order 
to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process and reduce the 
negative consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will improve 
the NSGPRD.  
The objectives of this study are reached by answering six research questions and testing six 
hypotheses. The questions are formulated to take full advantage of the available data and use them 
to identify the growth poles and explain the factors that differentiate them from the other cities. By 
identifying and explaining the most attractive poles, I have reached two of the main objectives of the 
study. In addition, by reaching the first two objectives, I gathered elements to reach the third 
objective, i.e., to formulate policy recommendations to strengthen their attraction, which will enable 
them to attract migrants who would otherwise go to the MAPAP. Because I used the growth pole 
and dependency theories as frameworks, the study also tests some of their hypotheses.  
The data processing includes basic statistical analysis and the mapping of the data to test the 
hypotheses of the growth pole theory and dependency theory and visualize complex migration 
patterns.  
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Identification of the Poles 
The first three research questions identify the strongest growth poles among the eight 
regional capitals by testing hypotheses pertaining to urban primacy and growth pole theory. With 
these questions, I will identify the regional capitals that have the stronger attraction power expressed 
by their ability to attract 1) the largest number of migrants to their departments compared to the 
MAPAP, 2) the largest substantial number and percentage of cities that have a certain population 
size and, 3) the largest substantial number and percentage of migrants from cities that are far away 
within their departments. The regional capitals with the strongest attraction power are the preferred 
locations to concentrate public investments, promote private investments and, relocated socio-
economic activities from the MAPAP. The availability of jobs and socio-economic infrastructure will 
strengthen their already strong attraction power and they will be able to attract migrants that would 
otherwise go to the MAPAP.  
Question 1: How does the urban primacy of the MAPAP affect the attraction power of the 
regional capitals?   
Hypothesis 1: The MAPAP receives more migrants from the regions than the corresponding 
regional capitals and the number of migrants to the MAPAP decreases when the distance between 
the MAPAP and the regional capitals increase 
This first question tests the main assumption of the primate city concept that the primate 
city overwhelmingly dominates all the socio-economic activities of the country (Jefferson 1939). As a 
primate city, the MAPAP should attract more migrants from anywhere in the country than the 
regional capitals. At the same time, this question tests the growth pole theory hypothesis that such 
domination decreases when the distance increases (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). 
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To answer research question 1 and test hypothesis 1, I have computed the ratio of the total 
number of migrants from each department living in the MAPAP to the total number of migrants of 
the same department living in the regional capital.  
Ratio =  Number of migrants from department X living in its regional capital 
              Number of migrants from department X living in the MAPAP 
The regional capitals with the smallest ratio are the strongest poles at the national level 
where socio-economic activities should be relocated from the MAPAP; it is where public and private 
investments in infrastructure, social services and job creation activities should be concentrated and 
promoted.  
Question 2: How does the population size of the cities of origin explain the share of 
migrants?   
Hypothesis 2:  The percentage of migrants out decreases when the size of the cities 
of origin increases. 
 
Question 2 and hypothesis 2 test the assumption of growth pole theory that the larger cities 
have a stronger attraction power and have the capacity to retain their population (Von Thunen 
1966). In reverse, small cities have limited attraction power and their population tends to migrate to 
larger cities. It is a sign of strong attraction power for a regional capital to attract migrants from large 
cities within region.  
To answer research question 2 and test hypothesis 2, I have built the following table for each 
department (table 7, appendix 3):  
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Table 7: Example of the tables used to answer to Q2 and H2: Department of Artibonite: population and 
number of migrants sent to the regional capital by city of origin  
 
Cities of origin Population 
Number of migrants 
sent to the regional 
capital 
Anse Rouge 8,867 749 
Desdunes 18,970 516 
Dessalines 18,224 321 
Ennery 3,132 248 
Estère 13,046 286 
Grande Saline 2,824 118 
Gros Morne 21,207 942 
La Chapelle 3,665 0 
Marmelade 5,355 142 
Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite 27,012 59 
Saint Marc 90,382 167 
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye 21,458 277 
Terre Neuve 906 898 
Verrettes 26,927 50 
                     Source, Haitian Institute for Statistics and Informatics (IHSI)-RGPH 2003 
 
Then, I ran a regression analysis testing the correlation between the number of migrants and 
the size of their cities of origin:  
 
Where: 
 Xi = the number of migrants sent to the regional capital by city of origin i 
Yi = the population of city of origin i 
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis 
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively 
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r :  the correlation between the size of the city of origin and the number of migrants sent to 
the regional capital. 
The regional capitals that do not support this hypothesis are the strongest poles, i.e., they 
attract migrants even from large cities that should have the ability to retain their own population. 
This is where socio-economic activities should be relocated from the MAPAP and where public 
investments should be concentrated and private investments promoted.  
Question 3: How does the distance between the cities of origin and the destination 
(regional capital) affect the number of migrants?  
Hypothesis 3:  The number of migrants decreases as the distance increases.  
Question 3 and test hypothesis 3 test the assumption of growth pole theory that the 
influence of the larger cities decreases when distance increase (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). 
To answer research question 3 and test hypothesis 3, I have built the following table for each 
department (table 8, appendix 4):  
Table 8: Example of the tables used to answer to Q3 and H3: Department of Artibonite: number of migrants 
sent to the regional capital by city of origin and distance between the regional capital and each city of origin  
 
Cities of origin  
Number of 
migrants 
Distance from the 
regional capital 
Anse Rouge 749 32.79 
Desdunes 516 20.2 
Dessalines 321 20.24 
Ennery 248 18.39 
Estère 286 15.16 
Grande Saline 118 33.47 
Gros Morne 942 18.45 
La Chapelle 0 59.29 
Marmelade 142 32.8 
Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite 59 37.61 
Saint Marc 167 33.88 
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye 277 34.26 
Terre Neuve 898 17.76 
Verrettes 50 44.15 
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                             Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003 
Then, I ran a regression analysis testing the correlation between the number of migrants 
received by the regional capital and the distance to the regional capital from each city of origin.  
 
Where: 
 Xi = the number of migrants received by the regional capital i 
Yi = the distance of city i from the regional capital  
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis 
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively 
r :  the correlation between the number of migrants from each city of origin and the distance 
between each city of origin and the regional capital. 
The regional capitals that do not support this hypothesis are the strongest poles i.e. they 
attract migrants from cities that are located far away, which illustrates the geographic extent of their 
attraction power. This is where socio-economic activities should be relocated from the MAPAP and 
where public investments should be concentrated and private investments promoted.  
 
These three questions combined will help identify the strongest regional poles. I have 
constructed an index with the results to these three questions. For each question, a number from 1 
(weakest) to 8 (strongest) is assigned to each regional capital. The number is the rank of each 
regional capital among the 8 regional capitals. These numbers are added up for each capital to 
identify the overall strongest to the weakest poles.  
Strength of a regional capital/pole = rank1 + rank 2 + rank 3 
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Where: 
 Rank 1= rank for the answer to Q1/H1 
Rank 2= rank for the answer to Q2/H2 
Rank 3= rank for the answer to Q3/H3 
Explanation of the Attraction Power of the Strongest Poles  
The fourth, fifth, and sixth questions explain the attraction power of the strongest poles by 
testing the assumptions of growth pole and dependency theories and the assumptions of the 
concept of urban primacy, namely the effect of the MAPAP, the effect of the distance between the 
MAPAP and the regional capitals on the impact of the primate city, the size of the regional capital 
and the links with the international market expressed. The links to the international market is 
measured by the amount of local import taxes collected. The strategic location and the infrastructure 
provide an interface with the international market. The amount of taxes shows the presence of a 
private sector taking advantage of this interface.  
Question 4: How does the distance of the regional capital from the MAPAP explain 
the number of migrants in the regional capitals?   
Hypothesis 4: The number of migrants to the regional capitals increases when the 
distance between the MAPAP and the regional capital increases  
Question 4 and Hypothesis 4 test the assumptions of the primate city concept that the 
primate city will dominate the entire urban system (Jefferson 1939); such domination extends to all 
socioeconomic activities including migration. They also test the growth pole theory hypothesis that 
the influence of a large city, in this case the MAPAP will decrease when the distance increases 
(Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966).  
To answer research question 4 and test hypothesis 4, I have built the following table (table 
9):  
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Table 9: Distance to the MAPAP and number of migrants received by regional capital   
 
Regional Capital 
Distance from 
the MAPAP 
Number of urban-
to-urban migrants 
received 
Cap Haitien 203.35                44,470  
Fort Liberte 243.95                  2,098  
Gonaives 151.98                24,702  
Hinche 115.96                  1,941  
Jacmel 80.43                  2,357  
Jeremie 286.52                  3,359  
Les Cayes 190.74                10,590  
Port de Paix 228.50                14,686  
                         Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003 
Then, I ran a regression analysis testing the correlation between the number of migrants 
received by the regional capital and the distance of each regional capital to the MAPAP.  
 
Where: 
 Xi = the number of urban-to-urban migrants received by regional capital i 
Yi = the distance between regional capital i and the MAPAP 
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis 
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively 
r :  the correlation between the number of urban-to-urban migrants received by each regional 
capital and the distance between each regional capital and the MAPAP.  
If the data support the hypothesis, concentrating the public investments and promoting 
private investments in the furthest regional capitals will have the fastest impact in attracting a larger 
number of migrants to those capitals.  
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Question 5: How does the size of the regional capitals explain the number of 
migrants?   
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of migrants to the regional capitals increases with the 
size of the population of the regional capitals  
 
To answer research question 5 and test hypothesis 5, I have built the following table (Table 
10). 
Table 10: Population and number of migrants received by regional capital   
Regional Capital Population 
Number of 
migrants received 
Cap Haitien         204,058                 44,470  
Fort Liberte           16,625                   2,098  
Gonaives         160,501                 24,702  
Hinche           24,131                   1,941  
Jacmel           30,183                   2,357  
Jeremie           33,829                   3,359  
Les Cayes           55,276                 10,590  
Port de Paix           70,742                 14,686  
                   Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003 
 
Then, I computed the coefficient of correlation between the total population of the capitals 
and the number of migrants received and the coefficient of correlation between the percentage of 
the total urban population of the department represented by the regional capitals and the percentage 
of migrants in the capitals.  
 
Where: 
 Xi = the number of migrants received by regional capital 
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Yi = the population of regional capital i 
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis 
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively 
r :  the correlation between the size of the regional capital and the number of migrants 
received.  
Question 5 and hypothesis 5 test the growth pole theory hypothesis that the attraction 
power of a city increases with its size (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966).  If the data support the 
hypothesis, concentrating the public investments and promoting private investments in the largest 
regional capital will have the fastest impact in attracting a larger number of migrants to those 
capitals.  
 
Question 6: How does the dependency of the economy affect the migration patterns 
in urban centers?  
Hypothesis 6: The amount of import taxes collected is higher in the strongest 
regional capitals.   
The amount of import taxes collected is used as a proxy to measure the ability of the local 
population to take advantage of economic opportunities linked to the international market available 
because of the location of the regional capitals. This question tests the hypothesis that, outside of 
the primate cities, other cities in the Caribbean including Haiti, cities with economic activities linked 
to the international market tend to grow faster (Portes 1989; Portes 1994; Portes 1997).  
To answer research question 6 and test hypothesis 6, I have built the following table (Table 
11). 
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Table 11: Amount of import taxes collected and number of migrants received 
Cities  Total import taxes in gourdes Number of migrants 
Gonaives 75,639,219.34 4,773 
Cap Haitien 157,897,655.24 16,050 
Miragoane 108,607,104.60 296 
Port de Paix 26,987,838.37 4,998 
Saint Marc 90,153,466.86 1,896 
Ouanaminthe 11,736,285.58 1,513 
Jacmel 970,227.32 710 
Cayes 4,813,272.58 2,842 
Jérémie 698,645.53 1,384 
Belladère 1,300,239.36 225 
Fort Liberté 2,099,326.24 827 
Anse à Pîtres 34,919.53 839 
                Source, IHSI-RGPH 2003 and BRH 
 
Then, I have computed the coefficient of correlation between the number and percentage of 
migrants received by the regional capitals and the amount of taxes collected.  
 
Where: 
 Xi = the number of migrants received by regional capital i 
Yi = the amount of import taxes collected in regional capital i 
n = the number of observation (cities) in the analysis 
Sx, Sy = the standard deviations of X and Y respectively 
r :  the correlation between the total amount of import taxes in gourdes collected in each 
regional capital and the number of migrants received. 
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The dynamism of the local private sector will increase the return on the public investments 
and attract new private investments in a multiplying effect. It may be necessary to energize the 
private sector in places where it is less dynamic.  
 
Mapping Methodology to Illustrate the Migration 
Patterns at the Regional Level   
The Geographical Information System (GIS) software MapInfo 5.0 was used to create maps 
for this study. GIS is a powerful tool that can be used to display and visualize otherwise complicated 
geographic data and trends. The data used for this research are geographic (location of the cities and 
distance) and demographic (population of the cities, number of migrants). The phenomena being 
studied are both spatially static (population and distance) and dynamic (migration flows); they 
interact to explain the migration patterns at the regional level. Mapping the data allows for the 
visualization of complex patterns and helps illustrate the tables.   
The migration maps are created following a three-step process, with one map for each 
region. A map is created with the population data in a first step, and with the migration data in a 
second step. In the third step, both maps are combined to provide a complete picture of migration 
patterns in relation to the size of the city of origin and the size of the regional capitals, the relative 
location of the cities, and their distance to the regional capitals.  
The maps are used to illustrate the findings and describe and illustrate identified geographic 
migration patterns.  
Step 1: Urban population map 
The urban population map has the following layers: 
• A map with the limits of the communes 
• A map with the location of the chef-lieux of communes (capital/principal city), 
including the regional capital to which are annexed population data  
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A first map is created with these two layers. In the background it contains the limits of the 
communes. On top of this layer is overlaid a thematic layer: each city is represented by a round 
symbol, the size of which is proportional to its population size.  
Mapping these data projects the cities in the geographic space: The cities are no longer 
separate entities but are located in relationship to each other. More importantly, the cities are located 
in relation to the regional capital. 
In addition, the proportional size symbols allow the reader to visualize where the largest or 
smallest cities are located and their relative distance to the regional capital. The reading of the map 
will help identify geographic patterns and answer questions: for example, are the largest cities further 
away from the regional capital or are they closer? In other words, does distance from the regional 
capital affect the size of the cities of origin?  
Step 2: Mapping the migration data 
The second step is the mapping of migration data: the number of migrants between each city 
of origin and the regional capital. The layer used in this step is created using Map Info’s “spider” tool. 
Spider works by using two layers of point features; the first must contain the destination point and 
the second the origin point. The spider tool creates a series of lines feature that links each origin to 
one destination, creating a spider web design, hence the name. The created lines are saved in a new 
layer and constitute new geographic line objects/features to which attribute data can be added. 
For the purposes of this research, the first layer of the destination feature point contains the 
regional capitals. The second layer of the origin feature points contains the other cities of the 
department. The lines link each city of origin to the regional capital. The data added to the lines 
features are the number of migrants from each city of origin to the regional capital. The migration 
data are represented by the width of each line.  
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Step 3: Building the final map: mapping the migration patterns  
The final step of the mapping process is putting together the final maps. The maps created 
during the two previous steps are overlaid; with the population maps at the bottom of the pile and 
the migration data on top. The resulting maps provide at the same time the visualization of the 
population and migration data projected in the geographic space. This combination provides a 
picture of the effects of distance, location, size of the cities of origin, and size of the regional capitals 
on the number of migrants.   
The final maps provide a visual test of the growth theory and dependency theory 
hypotheses. Are the migrants coming mainly from the smallest cities? Are they coming mainly from 
the closest cities? Do cities located in strategic areas with economic ties to the international market 
attract more migrants?  
The mapping of migration data using the spider tool projects these data into the geographic 
space. By doing so, it also provides a visualization of geographic migration patterns: the geographic 
origin of the migrants, their destination, the distance between the two, their relative location to each 
other, and the significance of the migration flows. This image helps identify geographic trends and 
provides a visual answer to the research questions.  
In addition, topographic, hydrographic, and road data will be placed as layers over the 
demographic maps; allowing one to investigate whether factors such as natural barriers, sub-regional 
geographic entities, or transportation networks can also provide additional explanations of the 
results.  
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Results and Findings 
In this chapter, I present the results to each of the research questions and hypothesis and the 
implications of those results for the growth pole and dependency theories and, for the objectives of 
the research.  
The Regional Capitals: Primary Destinations for Urban-
to-Urban Migrants of their Respective Department  
It is important to assess whether the regional capitals are also the regional poles of their 
respective departments. If they are all regional poles, this will decrease the significance of one of the 
limitations of this study, the selection criteria of the units of analysis based on administrative status. 
This assessment is made by comparing, for each department, the percentage of urban-to-urban 
migrants received by the regional capitals versus the percentage received by the other cities of the 
same region or elsewhere. The percentage of migrants in each city’s population will also be 
compared.  
The data show that the regional capitals stand out as regional attraction poles in their 
respective urban system: they are the primary destination for urban-to-urban migrants of their 
department. On average, the department capitals receive 54.61% of the migrants from their 
respective regions. Comparatively, the other cities attract only an average of 3.79% of the urban-to-
urban migrants—an average that is 14.41 times less than the capitals. The standard deviation of 
25.67 shows important differences among the capitals for which the percentage varies from 20.67% 
for Fort Liberté to 91.12% for Cap Haïtien. Although there are important differences among the 
percentage of migrants received by each capital, they all attract a substantially higher percentage of 
migrants than the other cities of their respective department (table 12; figure 4).  
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Table 12: Percentage of urban-to-urban migrants by place of residence by department  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of urban-to-urban migrants by regional capitals and the other cities by department   
 
 
 
Percentage of urban-to-urban migrants 
by place of residence  
Percentage of urban-to-urban 
migrants received by place of 
residence  
Department Capitals 
Average 
Percentage 
of 
Department 
Ratio 
Percentage 
Capitals 
Average 
Percentage 
of 
Department 
Ratio 
South 5.14 2.25 2.29 69.64 1.86 37.44 
Grande Anse 4.09 2.44 1.68 48.07 3.05 15.76 
North 7.87 2.73 2.88 91.12 0.49 185.96 
Center 2.15 1.59 1.36 33.35 6.05 5.51 
South East 2.35 3.47 0.68 32.96 7.44 4.43 
North West 7.07 2.64 2.68 85.21 1.64 51.96 
Artibonite 2.97 1.26 2.36 55.86 3.15 17.73 
North East 4.97 2.56 1.94 20.67 6.61 3.13 
Minimum 2.15 1.26 0.68 20.67 0.49 3.17 
Maximum 7.07 3.47 2.36 91.12 7.44 185.96 
National Average 5.73 2.37 1.98 68.58 4.78 40.24 
Standard Deviation 2.19 0.69   28.08 2.80   
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The percentage of migrants in the population of the capitals also remains modest. The 
average percentage of migrants in the total population of the regional capital is 4.58%. This number 
varies from 2.15% for the city of Hinche to 7.87% for Cap Haïtien. A standard deviation of 2.11 
shows a homogenous group. Despite these low numbers, the regional capitals have an average of 
approximately twice (1.98) the percentage of migrants than the other cities in their own departments. 
Except for the city of Jacmel in the South East department, all the capitals have a higher percentage 
of migrants than other cities in their department (table 12; figure 5).  
Figure 5: Presence of urban-to-urban migrants in cities  
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All the regional capitals are poles in their respective region when it comes to the percentages 
of urban-to-urban migrants received. In term of the percentage of migrants in the total population, 
only the city of Jacmel does not have a higher percentage than the other cities in the South East 
Department. Because all the capitals meet at least one criteria of a regional pole 1) the largest 
number of migrants to their departments compared to the MAPAP, 2) the largest substantial 
number and percentage of cities that have a certain population size or, 3) the largest substantial 
number and percentage of migrants from cities that are far away within their departments. The 
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limitations of the research design should have less of an impact on the outcome of the study and the 
tests of the hypotheses.   
Identification of the Strongest Poles 
The strongest poles at the national level: Influence of the MAPAP in the migration patterns 
Question 1: How does the urban primacy of the MAPAP affect the attraction power of the 
regional capitals?   
Hypothesis 1: The MAPAP receives more migrants from the regions than the corresponding 
regional capitals and the number of migrants to the regional capitals decreases when the distance 
between the MAPAP and the regional capitals increase 
Even at the regional level, the regional capitals face fierce competition from the MAPAP in 
attracting intradepartmental migrants. There is an average 4.67 times more migrants from each 
department in MAPAP than in the regional capitals. Except for Cap Haïtien with a ratio of 0.97, 
more migrants from each region go to MAPAP than to their regional capitals: Cap Haïtien is the 
strongest pole with the ability to compete against the MAPAP when it comes to attracting migrants 
from the Department of the North. Port de Paix in the North West (1.12), Gonaives in the 
Artibonite (2.05), and Fort Liberté in the North East (2.17) are strong poles. The highest ratios are 
in the South East, with 49.60, followed by Grande Anse (38.82) and the Center (21.48). The capitals 
of these departments (respectively Jacmel, Jérémie and Hinche are completely overshadowed by the 
MAPAP and are the weakest poles (table 13 and figure 6). 
Table 13: Migrants from the departments to MAPAP and to the regional capitals  
                                           Jacmel 
Cap 
Haitien  
Fort 
Liberte   Gonaives Hinche  
 
Les Cayes 
 
Jeremie 
Port de 
Paix  Total 
MAPAP 67,652 31,746 3,224 39,069 18,989 85,878 107,067 12,794 366,419 
Regional capitals  1,364 32,857 1,487 19,035 884 8,623 2,758 11,412 78,420 
Ratio MAPAP/RC 49.60 0.97 2.17 2.05 21.48 9.96 38.82 1.12 4.67 
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Figure 6: Migrants from the departments to the MAPAP and the regional capitals  
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The gap between MAPAP and the regional capitals is also more important in terms of the total 
number of migrants from other departments living in urban areas. MAPAP receives 88.42% of the 
total number of migrants from other departments living in urban areas; the average for the regional 
capitals is 0.72%; only Cap Haïtien and Gonaives have more than 1%, and all the other regional 
capitals have less than 1% (table 12, 13).  
The influence of the MAPAP over the entire Haitian urban system including the regional 
capitals confirms theory of the overwhelming domination of a primate city over the entire country 
(Jefferson 1939). However, Cap Haïtien, Port de Paix, Fort Liberté and  Gonaives do have a strong 
enough attraction power within their region to compete against the attraction power of the MAPAP 
(Table 14). 
 88 
 
Table 14: Percentages of the total number of migrants living in the regional capitals and the MAPAP 
 
The size of the cities of origin   
Question 2: How does the population size of the cities of origin explain the number of 
migrants?   
Hypothesis 2:  The percentage of migrants decreases when the size of the cities of origin 
increases. 
Depending on the department, the correlation between the number of migrants moving to 
the regional capitals and the size of the cities of origin either weakly supports or rejects the 
hypothesis. Only the North West, Grande Anse, and Artibonite departments support the hypothesis 
with a weak negative correlation of -0.33, -0.39, and –0.18. The data for the remaining five 
departments reject the hypothesis with a weak to moderate positive correlation: the number of 
migrants tends to increase with the size of the city of origin. The Center, South East and South 
Place of residence  
Total number of 
migrants 
% in the RC 
population 
% of migrants 
from other cities 
Number of 
migrants from 
other depts. % 
% of 
migrants 
from other 
depts. living 
in urban 
areas 
Jacmel           2,357  0.27        0.35                  850  0.10 0.21 
Cap Haïtien         44,470  5.16        6.66             10,718  1.24 2.59 
Fort Liberté           2,098  0.24        0.31                  386  0.04 0.09 
Gonaives         24,702  2.87        3.70               5,565  0.65 1.34 
Hinche           1,941  0.23        0.29                  998  0.12 0.24 
Les Cayes         10,590  1.23        1.59               1,728  0.20 0.42 
Jérémie           3,359  0.39        0.50                  568  0.07 0.14 
Port de Paix         14,686  1.70        2.20               2,998  0.35 0.72 
MAPAP        500,002  57.99      74.85        366,419  42.50 88.42 
Total number of 
migrants        862,166            
Total number of 
migrants to urban area        667,961            
Total number from 
other departments        467,016            
Total number living in 
urban areas from other 
departments        414,385            
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departments have a very weak positive correlation of 0.2, 0.12, and 0.065, respectively. The rejection 
of the hypothesis is somewhat moderate for the North East and the North, which have a positive 
correlation of 0.53 and 0.45 (table 15, maps 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).  
Depending on the department, migrants will come from smaller urban centers (North West, 
Grande Anse, and Artibonite), slightly more from larger urban centers (Center, South East, and 
South) and mainly from larger urban centers (North East and North). 
Fort Liberté in the North East and Cap Haïtien in the North are the strongest poles that 
have the capacity to attract migrants even from the other large cities of their departments. Port de 
Paix in the North West, Jérémie in the Grande Anse and Gonaives in the Artibonite are the weakest.  
 
Table 15: Correlation between distance, population, and number of migrants 
 Department 
Correlation between size of the 
cities of origin and the number of 
migrants 
Correlation between distance and 
number of emigrants 
North 0.53 -0.48 
North West -0.33 -0.53 
North East 0.45 -0.59 
South East 0.12 -0.46 
Grande Anse -0.39 -0.76 
Artibonite -0.18 -0.6 
Center 0.2 -0.74 
South 0.065 -0.11 
Correlation between population of the regional capitals and number of 
migrants 0.891960468 
Correlation between distance and number of migrants 0.418266465 
 
Size of the Cities of Origin  
Question 3: How does the distance between the cities of origin and the destination (regional 
capital) affect the number of migrants?  
Hypothesis 3:  The number of migrants decreases as the distance increases.  
 90 
 
The correlation between the number of migrants and the distance between the cities of 
origin and destination supports the hypothesis, at different levels. All the departments present a 
negative correlation. The attraction power of the regional capitals tends to decrease with distance. 
The migrants principally originate from the closest cities. This result support Boudeville’s 
assumption that the influence of a growth pole decreases with distance (Boudeville 1966).   
The coefficient of correlation varies from a weak -0.11 for the South to a strong -0.76 for 
the South East. (table 15, maps 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).  
Among the regional capitals, Les Cayes in the South has the largest geographic attraction 
power while Jacmel in the South East has the weakest.  
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Map 3: Artibonite 
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Map 4: Center 
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Map 5: Grande Anse 
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Map 6: North 
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Map 7: North East 
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Map 8: North West 
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Map 9: South 
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Map 10: South East 
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 The composite index built with the ranking of the regional capitals by the scores for each 
of the previous questions gives an overall ranking of the regional capitals illustrating their 
attraction power. Cap Haïtien in the North is by far the strongest regional pole both at the 
national and regional levels with a score of 22. It is followed by Les Cayes in the South (16) and 
Fort Liberté (16) in the North East. Socio-economic activities should be relocated, public 
investments should be concentrated, and private investments promoted in these cities to have the 
most important impact (Rondinelli Jan-83; Rondinelli Oct-83). Even investing in the weakest pole 
like Jérémie in the Grande Anse (with a score 4) will induce the development of the smaller 
towns and the rural area of its department (Rondinelli 1978; Rondinelli Oct-83)  (table 16).  
These findings are a strong argument for aggressive government interventions in order to 
make the regional capitals more attractive to migrants. This should initiate a more effective 
decentralization process.   
 
Table 16: Rank and composite index of attraction power 
  
Regional 
capitals 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Correlation 
between size of the 
cities of origin and the 
number of migrants 
Rank Correlation 
between distance and 
number of emigrants 
 
 
 
 
Rank ratio of 
migrants from 
the departments 
to MAPAP and 
to the regional 
capitals 
 
 
 
 
 
Composite index 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank based on the 
Index 
Cap Haitien 
8 6 8 22 1 
Port de Paix  
2 5 7 14 4 
Fort Liberte 
7 4 5 16 2-3 
Jacmel  
5 7 1 13 5 
Jeremie  
1 1 2 4 8 
Gonaives 
3 3 6 12 6 
Hinche 
6 2 3 11 7 
Les Cayes 
4 8 4 16 2-3 
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Explanation of the Poles’ Attraction Power  
The Distance from the MAPAP 
Question 4: How does the distance of the regional capital from the MAPAP explain the 
number of migrants in the regional capitals?   
Hypothesis 4: The number of migrants to the regional capitals increases when the 
distance between the MAPAP and the regional capital increases  
The regional urban systems also exist in the larger national system. According to the 
growth pole theory and the assumptions of urban primacy, a primate city like Port-au-Prince will 
have an important impact on the entire national urban system (Jefferson 1939). The impact of 
Port-au-Prince on the capacity of a regional capital to attract urban-to-urban migrants from its 
department will decrease with distance (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). In short, the regional 
capital furthest to Port-Au-Prince will attract more migrants.  
With a correlation of 0.41 between the distance from MAPAP and the number of 
migrants, the primate city has a moderate effect on the number of migrants: the distance between 
the regional capitals and the MAPAP has a moderate effect on the number of migrants received 
and the regional capitals located further from MAPAP tend to receive a slightly more significant 
number of migrants. However, some exceptions explain the moderate correlation. For instance, 
Cap Haïtien and Fort Liberté are at relatively similar distance from Port-au-Prince (203.35 and 
190.74 miles, respectively) but attract different percentages of migrants from the other cities of 
their department (91.2% and 20.67%, respectively) (table 17). Although the size of MAPAP has 
an important impact on the attraction power of the regional capitals, the moderate level of such 
influence provides a hint that other factors also contribute greatly in explaining the attraction 
power and the need for future research. Distance from the MAPAP should not be an important 
concern when choosing the regional pole to re-enforce. The evidence does not support the 
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assumption of the urban primacy concept that the MAPAP, a primate city, will have an 
overwhelming impact over all the cities of the Haitian urban system.  At the same time, the 
evidence moderately supports the assumption of the growth pole theory hypothesis that the 
influence of the MAPAP will decrease when the distance increases.  
Table 17: Size of the regional capitals, number of migrants, and distance from the MAPAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size of the Regional Capitals    
Question 5: How does the size of the regional capitals explain the number of migrants?   
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of migrants to the regional capitals increases with the size 
of the population of the regional capitals  
The data support the hypothesis with a strong correlation of 0.89 between the total 
population of the regional capitals and the number of migrants received. There is also a strong 
correlation of 0.78 between the percentage of the total urban population of the department 
represented by the regional capitals and the percentage of migrants received. The largest regional 
capitals and the regional capitals with the largest share of the urban population of their 
Regional capitals Population 
Number of 
migrants 
Distance from 
Port-au-Prince (miles) 
Cap Haïtien 204,058 16,050 203.35 
Fort Liberté 16,625 827 190.74 
Gonaives 160,501 4,773 243.95 
Hinche 24,131 520 151.98 
Jacmel 30,183 710 115.96 
Jérémie 33,829 1,384 80.43 
Les Cayes 55,276 2,842 286.52 
Port de Paix 70,742 4,998 228.50 
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department attract more migrants. They are therefore the strongest poles (table 16, maps 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10).  
The larger the regional capitals, the more migrants they attract from their own region 
(Boudeville 1966; Boventer 1970). Thus, regional capitals of Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, and Port de 
Paix will be able to play a more important role in decreasing the growth of the primate city of 
Port-au-Prince.  
The Local Private Sector     
Question 6: How does dependency affect the migration patterns in urban centers?  
Hypothesis 6: The amount of import taxes collected is higher in the strongest regional 
capitals.   
Tax collection points are located in all the regional capitals (except Hinche) as well as in 
key urban centers that play a role in international trade (table 18).  
 
Table 18: Import taxes by tax collection points (2001–2002) 
Cities 
Total import taxes  
(in gourds) 
Number of migrants 
Gonaives 75,639,219.34 4773 
Cap Haïtien 157,897,655.24 16050 
Miragoane 108,607,104.60 296 
Port de Paix 26,987,838.37 4998 
Saint Marc 90,153,466.86 1896 
Ouanaminthe 11,736,285.58 1513 
Jacmel 970,227.32 710 
Cayes 4,813,272.58 2842 
Petit Goave 4,500.00 N/A 
Jérémie 698,645.53 1384 
Belladère 1,300,239.36 225 
Fort Liberté 2,099,326.24 827 
Anse à Pitres 34,919.53 839 
 
The location of the collection points coinciding with the cities attracting the larger 
percentage of migrants is the recognition, by the Haitian government, that the volume of 
international trade occurring in those places will generate an amount of taxes significant enough 
to justify such investments.  
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The data support the hypothesis that the more attractive cities have stronger ties with the 
international market. There is a strong positive correlation between the amount of taxes and the 
number of migrants (0.70).  
The amount of taxes collected depends on the volume of trade and the performance of 
the local tax collection office. However, it is a very common practice to bribe customs officers to 
avoid paying taxes. Local tax collection offices are often ill-equipped and understaffed, unable to 
fully recover the taxes. Those two parameters vary from one collection point to another. The 
historically high level of corruption in the Haitian public administration and the weakness of the 
local institutions make it very unlikely that the amount of taxes reflects the actual trade volume at 
each point. The tax data are used here with caution and the results must be interpreted with care.   
In Cap Haïtien and Saint Marc there has been an increase in import-export activities, a 
respective growth rate of 19.71% and 732%. Miragoane experienced a small decline of 10.04% 
while Jacmel experienced an important decline of 85.56% (table 19). 
Table 19: Growth rate of importation taxes by collection point (2000–2001 and 2001–2002) 
 Importation taxes 
Cities 2000–2001 2001–2002 Growth rate 
Gonaives 165,826,300.37 75,639,219.34 (54.39)
Cap Haïtien 131,902,009.42 157,897,655.24 19.71 
Miragoane 120,724,376.73 108,607,104.60 (10.04)
Port de Paix 24,597,034.26 26,987,838.37 9.72 
Saint Marc 10,829,544.13 90,153,466.86 732.48 
Ouanaminthe 9,980,072.38 11,736,285.58 17.60 
Jacmel 6,718,306.78 970,227.32 (85.56)
Cayes 5,964,046.87 4,813,272.58 (19.30)
Petit Goave 3,578,613.80 4,500.00 (99.87)
Jérémie 2,276,266.47 698,645.53 (69.31)
Belladère 500,576.19 1,300,239.36 159.75 
Fort Liberté 185,708.87 2,099,326.24 1,030.44 
Anse à Pîtres 135,148.96 34,919.53 (74.16)
Source: Research and Statistics, AGD 
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Cap Haïtien is the farthest from Port-au-Prince (203.5 miles), while Saint Marc (52.20 
miles) and Miragoane (58.20 miles) are both relatively close to the national capital. The distance 
from Port-au-Prince plays in the favor of Cap Haïtien. The city is the main port for the entire 
northern part of the country and the second largest city of the nation.   
The proximity of Port-au-Prince plays in the favor of cities like Saint Marc and but to a 
lesser extend in favor of Miragoane. The import taxes at the ports of these cities are less 
expensive than Port-au-Prince and less congested. In addition, because of the short distance, it is 
easy to use these ports to export goods that otherwise would have been shipped through Port-au-
Prince. These ports also have easy roadways access to the market of Port-au-Prince.  
A similar attempt to increase the use of the port of Jacmel has been unsuccessful. The 
port of Jacmel has been rehabilitated, but there has been little increase in import-export activities. 
Jacmel is further away from Port-au-Prince (115.96 miles) than Saint Marc and Miragoane but is 
still only two hours from Port-au-Prince. The population of Jacmel is not large enough to provide 
a market for international trade.  
However, Jacmel was in the past a very prosperous city, independent of Port-au-Prince 
with striving import/export activities. Jacmel directly exported the coffee produced in the 
surrounding areas. It also imported goods to be sold on its market and throughout the 
department. The port of Jacmel was closed during the U.S. occupation (1915 – 1934). In addition, 
a new road between Jacmel and Port-au-Prince was built to transport to the capital the coffee to 
be sold on the international market (Gilles 1995).  
The businessmen involved with coffee exports in Jacmel soon left the city to settle in 
Port-au-Prince, owning until today the largest coffee export companies in the country. The 
rehabilitation of the port of Jacmel occurred after national businessmen have already invested in 
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cargo ships and warehouses in Saint Marc and Miragoane. The shares of the import/export trade 
activities that could have gone to Jacmel were already taken over by these two cities.  
Public investments in infrastructure alone did not stimulate the economy of the cities. 
There was the lack of a dynamic private sector capable of taking advantage of such investments. 
In addition, because of the small size of the country, the port cities are competing against each 
other and all of them will not have enough share of the total trade activities to make such 
investments sustainable.  
The data support the dependency theory hypothesis. The link with the international 
market explains the growth of growth poles outside of the primate city. A combination of 
strategic location (on the coast), public investments (port facilities) and the local private sector 
explain the growth of the strongest poles (Rondinelli 1983; Portes 1989; Portes 1994; Rondinelli 
Jan-83).  However, economic dependency also has important negative effects on the development 
of developing countries and such dependency of the regional capitals’ economy might not lead 
the economic growth and development of the country (Cardoso 1971; Evens 1980; Bornschier 
1981; Bradshaw 1997).  
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Conclusion 
 
The main objectives of the study are: 
 To identify, among the regional capitals, the cities that have the characteristics to be 
potential “growth poles”  
 To explain how these cities differ from the other regional capitals   
 To formulate policy recommendations to strengthen the growth of these poles in 
order to increase the chances of success of the decentralization process and reduce 
the negatives consequences of urban primacy in Haiti. These recommendations will 
improve the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction Document 
(NSGPRD).  
In the concluding chapter I present an evaluation of my findings in light of the literature 
presented and the contribution of the research to the body of knowledge on Haiti, 
decentralization, dependency, urban primacy, and development theories. I will also discuss the 
policy relevance and implications of the research, made even more relevant by the devastating 
earthquake of January 12, 2010.  
 
A New Light on Urban Primacy and Decentralization 
Prospects in Haiti and the Third world  
Haiti is an example of extreme urban primacy, where if the Metropolitan Area of Port au 
Prince (MAPAP) ratio was set at 100 people (population of 2.5 millions inhabitants), the second 
city ratio in Cap Haïtien would be 8.1 (population of 204,508 inhabitants), and the third city ratio 
in Gonaives would be 6.42  (population of 160,501 inhabitants). Twenty-five percent of Haiti’s 
total population and 60% of the total urban population live in MAPAP. The migration data show 
that the influence of MAPAP is overwhelming: 63.80% of the total number of migrants live in 
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the Department of the West and 57.99% live in MAPAP; 84.10% of the number of migrants 
from other departments live in the West and 78.46% live in MAPAP. The other departments 
attract between 2.07% (North East) and 8.31% (Centre) of the total number of migrants (Table 
2).  The data confirm the literature about the consequences of urban primacy, such as the 
overwhelming domination of most aspects of the national life by the primate city (Jefferson 
1939).  
The population of the primate city of MAPAP is more likely to increase due to the 
current migration patterns. If nothing is done to halt this trend, the consequences of urban 
primacy in the primate city will also worsen. Such consequences include social and spatial 
exclusions (Fay 2005; Davis 2006; Koonings and Kruijt 2006; World Bank. Europe and Central 
Asia Region. Infrastructure Sector Unit. 2006)); high unemployment rates; lack of basic services 
such as decent housing, health care, clean water, and sanitation in slum-like neighborhoods in the 
primate city; (Fay 2005)  and violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2006).  
The overwhelming number and percentage of people migrating to MAPAP also 
perpetrates a polarized system where the other cities, including the regional capitals, attract a 
relatively low number and percentage of migrants. This slows the growth of the other cities and 
limits their capacity to contribute to the cessation or reduction of the growth of the population of 
MAPAP or to play an innovative diffusion and development role over their surrounding areas 
(Pedersen 1970; Brown 1981).  
The data show that the influence of MAPAP varies from one department to another and 
that there are regional disparities in this influence. At the regional level, MAPAP attracts on 
average 4.67 times more migrants from each department than the regional capital. Cap Haitien is 
the only exception; it attracts 32,858 migrants while MAPAP attracts 31,746 from the 
Department of the North. For the other regional capitals, the ratio of the number of migrants to 
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MAPAP over the number of migrants to the regional capital varies from 1.12 for Port de Paix to 
49.60 for Jacmel. These regional capitals can be divided into two groups based on the ratio. The 
first group has a low ratio and includes Fort Liberte (2.17), Gonaives (2.05), Les Cayes (9.96), and 
Port de Paix (1.12). The second group has a high ratio and includes the Jacmel (49.60) and 
Jeremie (38.82) (Table 20).  
Table 20: Migrants from the departments to MAPAP and to the regional capitals  
                                           
South 
East North 
North 
East Artibonite Center South 
Grande 
Anse 
North 
West Total 
MAPAP 67,652 31,746 3,224 39,069 18,989 85,878 107,067 12,794 366,419 
Regional capitals  1,364 32,857 1,487 19,035 884 8,623 2,758 11,412 78,420 
Ratio MAPAP/RC 49.60 0.97 2.17 2.05 21.48 9.96 38.82 1.12 4.67 
 
Although these findings confirm the overwhelming influence of the primate city of 
MAPAP over the migration patterns of the entire nation, they also show that there are 
spatial/regional variations to this influence. These variations allow for the identification of cities 
among the regional capitals that 1) attract more migrants than MAPAP (Cap Haitien); 2) attract a 
number of migrants that is lower than MAPAP’s (Fort Liberte, Gonaives and Port de Paix); and 
3) attract a number of migrants that is very small compared to MAPAP (Hinche, Les Cayes, 
Jacmel, and Jeremie).  
In addition, the data show that the regional capitals are all the primary destinations for 
migrants in their respective departments. On average, the department capitals receive 54.61% of 
the migrants while the other cities attract only an average of 3.79% of the urban-to-urban 
migrants—an average that is 14.41 times less than the capitals. The numbers vary from 20.67% 
for Fort Liberté to 91.12% for Cap Haïtien at the regional level.  
These findings show that, even in the case of extreme urban primacy like Haiti, there can 
be cities that have more influence over a given geographical area than the primate city (Cap 
Haitien) while other cities have a somewhat comparable influence (Gonaives and Port de Paix). 
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These findings bring new light in the literature about urban primacy that tends to be pessimistic 
and generic: the primate city of MAPAP does not have an overwhelming and uniform influence 
over the entire national territory. There are regional disparities and there are regions where the 
influence of the primate city is lower than that of the largest city within the region. This adds to 
the body of literature about urban primacy in general and urban primacy in Haiti in particular.  
The findings of the present study bring new prospects to the future of decentralization 
policies in countries with extreme cases of urban primacy like Haiti. Some scholars explain the 
failures of decentralization by citing the lack of secondary cities, which are cities that are large 
enough to perform important economic and social functions for their own populations and for 
populations in surrounding areas (Rondinelli 1983). In other words, cities that will be able to 
diffuse development at a regional level, attract and retain rural migrants, and slow the growth of 
the primate city.  Cap Haitien, by attracting more migrants than MAPAP in the department of the 
North, fits this description. The cities of Fort Liberte, Gonaives, Les Cayes, and Port de Paix that 
attract a slightly lower number of migrants from their respective region than MAPAP can be 
reinforced to attract more migrants and fit the description of secondary city as well. These cities 
can be instrumental in halting the growth of MAPAP.   
In addition, the regional capitals are the main destination for migrants in their respective 
regions. The regional capitals are already regional poles that can be reinforced to play a more 
important role in inducing development in their region. The combination of secondary cities at 
the national level and poles at the regional level is a positive sign in the prospect of a successful 
decentralization process in Haiti.   
The identification of regional poles is an important contribution to the debate 
surrounding decentralization in Haiti. Opponents of decentralization have argued that the local 
collectivities are not strong enough to carry out the new powers that come with decentralization 
  
Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies  – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies  - 
110 - 
 
(Deshommes 2000; Oriol April 2000). While that may be true for the majority of the local 
collectivities, especially the municipalities, the ones where the regional capitals (and more 
specifically where the three poles identified earlier) are located are clearly strong enough to 
compete with MAPAP at the national level and can be reinforced by the policymakers to become 
real engines of development at the regional level. They are strong enough to be used to 
implement a successful decentralization process.  
The findings also provide arguments for an incremental implementation of the 
decentralization process to maximize the use of scarce public funds by focusing on the cities that 
will have the greatest impact in halting the growth of MAPAP and inducing substantial regional 
development. Indeed, not all the local collectivities are identical and the poles identified earlier 
can play an important role in rebalancing the spatial distribution of socioeconomic activities. The 
poles are the secondary cities as described by Rondinelli (1983) and should be reinforced to 
maximize the chances of success of the current decentralization policy in Haiti.   
Finally, the study adds a new element to the debate by analyzing the Haitian urban system 
and how it can help reshape the spatial distribution of socioeconomic activities.  
Urban primacy is widespread and is increasing in the developing world. The challenges 
caused by urban primacy in the developing world are very hard but not impossible to overcome. 
Even in the case of extreme urban primacy like Haiti, this study has been able to identify cities 
with the potential to halt or reverse the consequences of urban primacy. In addition, Haiti is a 
relatively small country and given the influence of distance in explaining the existence of potential 
poles, the results are encouraging. Larger countries, even with extreme cases of urban primacy, 
will probably have potential growth poles. 
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Future of Testing the Growth Pole Theory in a Third 
World country  
The study tested some of the hypotheses of the growth theory, namely the impact of the 
size of the cities and the distance between cities in explaining the number of migrants. The 
distance between the regional capitals and MAPAP has a moderate effect on the number of 
migrants received and the regional capitals located further from MAPAP tend to receive a slightly 
more significant number of migrants. The moderate effect of distance is to be expected given the 
overwhelming influence of the primate city of MAPAP over the national territory.  
However, overall the number of migrants tends to decrease when the distance between 
the regional capital and the city of origin increases. The data show different levels of support for 
the growth pole theory hypothesis that the attraction power of a pole decreases when the distance 
increases (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). The influence of the regional capitals over the regional 
urban systems is less strong than the influence of MAPAP over the national urban system.   
The data strongly support the assumption that the attraction power of the regional 
capitals increases with population size. The data support the hypothesis with a strong correlation 
of 0.89 between the total population of the regional capitals and the number of migrants received. 
There is also a strong correlation of 0.78 between the percentage of the total urban population of 
the department represented by the regional capitals and the percentage of migrants received 
(Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). The regional capitals with the largest population are the 
strongest poles. Increasing the size of a pole by providing job opportunities or education and 
health facilities will in return strengthen its attraction power exponentially.  
The data also provide evidence that, depending on the department, migrants come from 
cities with largely different population sizes, weakly supporting or rejecting the growth theory 
hypothesis that migrants will come from smaller cities (Perroux 1955; Boudeville 1966). Only the 
North West, Grande Anse, and Artibonite departments support the hypothesis with a weak 
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negative correlation; the Center, South East, and South departments have a very weak positive 
correlation, and the North East and the North moderately reject the hypothesis. Depending on 
the department, migrants will come from smaller urban centers (North West, Grande Anse, and 
Artibonite), slightly more from larger urban centers (Center, South East, and South), and mainly 
from larger urban centers (North East and North). This shows that the attraction power of the 
regional poles is strong even over the largest urban centers of their regions. However, this can 
also imply that even the more important urban centers, including possibly the regional capitals, 
have difficulty retaining their populations. A question to investigate in the future is whether the 
larger urban centers are temporary destinations before migrating to MAPAP. If the answer is yes, 
another question to investigate is how to retain these transitory migrants. In addition to attracting 
more migrants, the poles need to be able to retain them and retain their own population.  
My findings do not definitively support or reject the hypotheses of the growth pole 
theory that I have tested. The theory selects poles by the concentration of economic activities. In 
the case of this study, the selection is solely based on the administrative characteristics of the 
regional capitals while the regional capitals have different demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics. I have used this selection method because I wanted to use the results to formulate 
policy recommendations that reflect the constitution of Haiti. Those differences may explain the 
different levels of support or rejection to the hypotheses, depending on the department.   
 
The growth pole theory was useful, however, in helping identify potential regional growth 
poles in a developing country with an extreme case of urban primacy like Haiti with its mega city, 
MAPAP. The findings confirm that despite the overwhelming influence of the primate city, it is 
still possible to identify urban centers that are suitable places to begin implementing 
decentralization. One of the main obstacles in testing the growth pole theory in a Third World 
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country is the lack of or limited availability of data (Rondinelli 1983). To conduct this research, I 
was fortunate enough to have data available and such data are becoming more widely available; 
this study illustrates how to use census data to address the consequences of urban primacy in 
developing countries. An increasing number of developing countries are conducting census 
operations on a regular basis. The United Nations Population Funds (UNFPA) and its partners 
have mobilized funds for a census round every 10 years in developing countries. UNFPA and its 
partners are also working on standardizing the census’ instruments and modernization the 
operations by using GPS, GIS, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), and database software in order 
to improve the quality of the data.  
The activities of UNFPA and its partners aim at better monitoring the progresses made in 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). However, the availability of new census 
data eliminates the obstacles for testing the growth pole theory in the developing countries. In 
addition, the actors are also promoting the use of census data to support development programs. 
This will provide a lot of opportunities to test the growth pole theory hypothesis in the third 
world, including cross-country or temporal analysis to assess the impact of a decentralization 
policy.  
Dependency Theory and Regional Urban Growth in Haiti  
All the regional capitals except Hinche have local import tax collection agencies. The 
establishment of the tax collection agencies in these cities is a recognition that substantial 
international trade activities are occurring. Although there is a positive correlation between the 
amount of taxes collected and the number and the percentage of migrants received, this result 
should be used with caution because of the poor quality of the data.  
Except for Hinche, all the regional capitals are coastal cities. They are in strategic 
locations that put them at the forefront of the link of the Haitian economy to the international 
  
Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies  – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban Studies  - 
114 - 
 
market. This role is reinforced by the existence of port facilities and the presence of a vibrant 
private sector involved in substantial trade activities.  
The integration of their economic activities into the international economic system due to 
their location, reinforced by port facilities and substantial export-oriented economic activities, 
explains the growth and attraction power of the regional capitals and rival poles.  
Finally, the data support the hypothesis of dependency theory stating that the cities with 
the strongest attraction power have the strongest ties with the international market; these ties are 
expressed by the amount of import taxes collected (Portes 1985; Portes 1994). These results and 
findings support the dependency theory hypotheses and more specifically Portes’ that, outside the 
primate city, cities with export-oriented economic activities grow at a faster pace (Portes 1994; 
Portes 1997). Is the effect of dependency on the growth of other urban centers yet another 
indicator of how economic dependency overall affects urban growth? Or, finally, is it an indicator 
of stronger integration of not only the economy but also of all the parts of the Haitian territory in 
the international economy? Haiti is a developing country and as such, the dependent nature of its 
economy will have a negative impact on its socioeconomic development (Cardoso 1971; 
Bradshaw 1987; Bradshaw 1991; Bradshaw 1997). 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The Limitations Due to the Lack of Data  
I have primarily used data that are available for all the units of analysis. This approach was 
necessary to be able to compare the results and draw conclusions that are essential to formulate 
recommendations to implement economic decentralization. However, this approach also limited 
the quantity of data available to fully understand the issues. In a developing country like Haiti, 
there are few institutions that collect routinely data on socioeconomic activities to inform 
policymakers. This situation makes it often difficult to conduct research in the Third World.    
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The first set of data that I have used is the census data that give, per department, the 
number of natives and the commune of place or birth (urban and rural). Unfortunately there are 
no data on the number of people who migrate from one regional capital to another. This 
information would have been useful to measure the ability of the capitals to retain their migrants 
or natives or their ability to attract migrants from the other capitals; in other words, the 
competitiveness within the national urban system. However, one can still know, for each city, the 
number of total migrants from every other department (table 6). 
The second set of data is the amount of import taxes to measure the dependency toward 
the international economy. This choice was dictated by the lack of economic data at the regional 
level. Data about the total value of goods imported–exported are only available at the national 
level and not by trade locations. Data on the private sector/employment for all the regional 
capitals are not available in a country where 68% of nonagricultural activities function in the 
informal sector. However, for the fiscal year of 2008–2009 for instance, the Haitian GDP was 
14,015 million gourdes while the value of imports was 18,317 and the value of exports was 4,312 
million gourdes (BRH 2010). These data show that Haiti imports more than it produces and the 
value of exports is really minimal compared to the value of imports. Data on importations 
provide a good estimation of international trade activities in the regional capitals. 
The study calls for future research that will help explain some of the findings and better 
understand the Haitian urban system and the attraction power of the regional capitals. The future 
research will also provide policymakers with additional elements to design a more detailed 
economic decentralization policy. The list of recommendations for future research presented here 
is in no mean exhaustive.   
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Test the Growth Pole Theory Using Other Criteria to Select the 
Units of Analysis  
One of the characteristics of the research design is the selection of the units of analysis 
based on their administrative status as regional capitals. The regional capitals vary largely in terms 
of population size. They also vary in terms of the percentage of the total urban population they 
represent.  
These variations may have affected the outcomes of the analysis and the results and 
findings. Conducting a similar analysis with, for instance, an urban center with the same 
population size or the same percentage of the total population of their departments may give a 
different outcome in testing the assumptions and hypotheses of the growth pole theory.   
Study of the Attraction Power of the Regional Capitals Beyond 
the Limits of the Regions 
 
Because the study analyzes migration patterns within regions, I cannot evaluate the 
attraction power of the regional capital beyond their region. I cannot evaluate the competition 
among regional capitals to capture migrants beyond the borders of their respective departments. 
Finally, I cannot assess if one regional capital has a broader attraction power even over another 
regional capital. For instance, does Cap Haitien attract more migrants from the North East than 
Fort Liberte, its regional capital? Or does Cap Haitien attract more migrants from the North East 
than MAPAP?  
The answers to those questions will be useful to policymakers to design an economic 
decentralization policy between the national level and the regional level, regrouping several 
departments. Such policy will reinforce existing spatial dynamics and better allocate limited public 
resources.  
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Understanding the Migrants’ Journey to Better Understanding of 
the Attraction Power of the Regional Capitals 
The 2003 Haitian census questionnaire asks the respondents about their birthplace and 
whether it is urban or rural. The respondents whose birthplace differs from the place of residence 
are the migrants. However, this information does not provide a complete picture of the migrants’ 
journey. For instance, have they migrated to another place before settling in the current place of 
residence? For how long? Are they planning on staying or moving to another place? Why did they 
move? Why do they want to move again?  
The answers to these questions will provide a more complete picture about what attracts 
migrants to the regional capitals or other places. Knowing where people move and why they 
move is essential to designing a spatial policy to attract them to specific places and to retain 
people in those places. These policies should focus on offering to the potential migrants the 
elements that are missing in the current place of residence that they want to have access to by 
migrating.  
A Better Understanding of the Structure of the Regional 
Capitals’ Private Sector  
The analysis of the import tax data to understand how dependency toward the 
international market affects population growth in the regional capitals shows a high level of 
correlation.  
The data also show that in Cap Haïtien and Saint Marc there has been an increase in 
import-export activities, a respective growth rate of 19.71% and 732%. Miragoane experienced a 
small decline of 10.04%, while Jacmel experienced an important decline of 85.56% (table 19). 
Cap Haïtien is the farthest from Port-au-Prince (203.5 miles), while Saint Marc (52.20 
miles) and Miragoane (58.20 miles) are both relatively close to the national capital. The distance 
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from Port-au-Prince plays in the favor of Cap Haïtien. The city is the main port for the entire 
northern part of the country and the second largest city of the nation.   
The port of Jacmel has been rehabilitated, but there has been little increase in import-
export activities. Jacmel is further away from Port-au-Prince (115.96 miles) than Saint Marc and 
Miragoane but is still only two hours from Port-au-Prince. The population of Jacmel is not large 
enough to provide a market for international trade.  
An analysis of the history of the city of Jacmel shows, for instance, that a change in the 
local private sector can help explain why the city is no longer able to engage in trade activities, as 
was the case in the past, despite heavy public investments in port facilities. A study of the local 
private sector involved in trade will help explain this issue, and help to design a policy to support 
the emergence of a more dynamic local private sector that will be able to increase the return on 
public investments.  
Spatial Modeling to Understand and Predict Migration Patterns  
The results and findings of the present study and of future research can be used with 
other spatial data to model migration patterns in Haiti. They should be combined with other 
spatial data such as satellite images, aerial photos, road maps, and topographic maps. GIS, remote 
sensing, and other technologies in the fields of spatial analysis can incorporate the various data to 
build a complex spatial model. Policymakers can use this model to better understand migration 
patterns but also predict the effect of specific policies on these patterns. Finally, such a model can 
be used as a monitoring and evaluation tool to assess the outcome of a national spatial economic 
decentralization policy.  
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Policy Relevance and Implications  
After the devastating 7.0 earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, the international 
community responded swiftly during the rescue and the immediate post-disaster relief efforts. 
The international community also made the commitment of continuing support for the 
rebuilding of Haiti. The Haitian government has expressed a strong determination to place the 
rebuilding effort in the context of the overall development of the country. The Haitian 
government and its partners held a first meeting in Montreal on January 25, 2010, and another 
meeting was held in New York on March the 31, 2010, during which the government presented 
the Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment (PDNA) and the National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) for the country to the donors. 
To elaborate the PDNA and the NSDP, the government has been conducting intensive 
consultations with members of the international community and groups of the Haitian civil 
society. According to the government, the result of the process is a document that should 
continue the program that the government had in place with the NGPRSD but will also address 
the issues brought to light by the earthquake.  Because the PDNA and the NSDP have not been 
released yet, the policy recommendations will focus on the NGPRSD but will also address the 
elements of the new national reconstruction program that have been released to the press so far.  
Elaborate a Comprehensive Economic Decentralization Policy 
Based on the Reinforcement of the Strongest Growth Poles 
The NGPRSD proposes activities as if Haiti will remain a rural country. The issues raised 
by this research are not addressed in a coherent and comprehensive manner in the NSGPRD. 
Elements of the solutions are scattered all over the documents and some elements are completely 
missing.  
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 The NGPRSD presents a series of activities pertaining to urban development at the city 
level. All these activities are essential to addressing important issues facing the Haitian cities. They 
will all contribute to creating vibrant and safe urban centers, improving the urban environment 
and providing employment opportunities and basic services to urban dwellers.   
 However, instead of scattering them throughout the document, it would have brought 
focus and attention to regroup them in a single comprehensive chapter, as is the case for rural 
development. Such a chapter would include the existing elements as well as a section of urban 
economic activities. Urban economic activities like industrial activities are missing from the 
NGPRSD. This chapter should also include strategic and spatial components. The NGPRSD 
should include a chapter on how the government plans to increase public investments in activities 
that will make specific cities as attractive as MAPAP (e.g., water, electricity, communications, and 
transportation infrastructure). At the same time, the government should lay out this plan to 
promote private investments in essential services such as banking. Finally, the government should 
provide incentives for existing private industries to relocate outside of MAPAP and to new 
investors to establish their companies outside MAPAP. These efforts should focus on the 
strongest regional poles identified in the present study.   
Decentralization of Economic Activities: Focus on the Strongest 
Poles  
Real decentralization will be achieved by delocalizing socioeconomic activities outside 
MAPAP. The primary beneficiaries of the delocalization of economic activities and social services 
outside Port-au-Prince should be the strongest poles: Cap Haitien, Port de Paix, and Gonaives. 
These cities should be in the mind of public officials when they are working with investors for 
non-geographic based economic activities. Some activities that can be delocalized are, for 
instance, the manufacturing jobs in textiles. In each of the three strongest poles, there is the 
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necessary labor force, the basic infrastructure in electricity, water, and communications to support 
these activities, and the international port facilities to ship the manufactured goods to the national 
and international markets.  
Cap Haitien has direct flights to and from Miami and Port au Prince. Gonaives is only 
37.28 miles from MAPAP. However, Port-de-Paix is more isolated, with a single roadway 
connection to Cap Haitien that also connects the city to the rest of the country.  
Goods from production sites in Cap-Haitien and Gonaives can more easily reach the 
national market. Investors in these sites could more easily reach their investment sites for quality 
control or other operation activities. For Port-de-Paix to present the same advantages, significant 
public investments in roadways should be made.  Cap Haïtien is the second largest city in the 
country and is at all levels the most attractive pole outside MAPAP. It can play an important role 
in attracting migrants not only from the department of the North but from all the northern parts 
of the country as well.  
The road network should be improved and rehabilitated in this perspective. Targeting the 
most attractive cities in a more aggressive manner can be the best way to still have the most 
impact while using limited resources. Similar important public investments in an important 
number of cities competing for the same markets/resources can limit the returns of such 
investments.   
Some of the elements of this part of the policy recommendations are already in the 
NGPRSD. However, they are not regrouped in the identified poles and are not part of an overall 
strategy to implement decentralization. There must be a better coordination of effort towards 
reinforcing the strongest poles in order to maximize their impact.  
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Encourage Spatially Based Economic Activities  
Besides these three cities, the other regional capitals already have most of the basic 
necessary infrastructure (electricity, phone, internet, water), although some improvements are 
needed. They have port facilities that link them to international markets in the case of export-
oriented production. They also have a population large enough and often more educated than 
those of smaller cities to offer the manpower to support the initial activities. The creation of jobs 
and the availability of social services will increase the attraction power of the regional capitals.  
At the same time, it is necessary to maintain activities that are locally based in other places 
and cities as well. Such activities would include the development of local tourism and the 
rehabilitation of the old town of Jacmel, for example. In the NGPRSD, tourism focuses on the 
departments of the West, the North, the South East, and the South because of their potential in 
this sector. These activities are expected to create an significant number of employment 
opportunities outside MAPAP. This will contribute to the reduction of the concentration of job 
opportunities in the primate city, halting its growth while contribution the population growth of 
the regions. 
In addition, public investments in infrastructure and roadways should seek to strengthen 
the relationship between regional capitals and the other cities of their region in order to transform 
the hinterland into a market for the sale of the goods produced or imported in the regional 
capitals. At the same time, the regional capitals will become a market for the production of 
smaller cities and the rural areas in their region.  
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Toward a Less Dependent Economy: Promote National Production 
for the National Market 
The study shows the role of economic dependency in explaining the growth of the 
regional capitals. However, economic dependency also has a very negative impact on the 
socioeconomic development of developing countries (Cardoso 1971; Myrdal 1978; Bradshaw 
1991). The increase of the national production is a major component of the NGPRSD. However, 
the new economic policy should also strive to find the balance between production for the 
national market and production for the international market. This will reduce the dependency of 
the Haitian economy and the negative impact of such dependency on the socioeconomic 
development of the country.  
Effective Leadership 
The rural area has a single institution in charge: the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural 
Resources and Rural Development (MANRRD). The mission of the MANRRD is to “Define the 
policy of the economic sector of the Haitian government in the areas of agriculture, cattle raising, 
renewable natural resources and rural development.” The urban area has no institution in charge 
of coordinating efforts and resources. Several governmental entities share responsibilities over the 
urban area: the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, 
and the Ministry of Local Collectivities. At the local level, the municipalities are in charge. 
Because of the multiplicity of actors there is no clear vision, instead there is a lack of leadership 
or coordination and an overlapping of roles, goals, and responsibilities.   
This lack of one focal point explains why this document contains all the dimensions of 
urban development and no vision. Such an organ will: 
• Set a vision 
• Coordinate actions 
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• Bring all the actors together 
• Do advocacy and fundraising  
This organ would bring urban development issues to the forefront of the national debates.  
 An effective decentralization policy requires not only strong leadership from the Haitian 
government, but also the inclusion of the private sector, the donors, the local institutions, and 
many other stakeholders in the process. It also requires the same leadership ability from the local 
institutions. All the policy recommendations have no real value until real changes occur within 
the Haïtian government, which is still considered among the weakest and the most corrupted in 
the world by Transparency International. In addition, the quasi-permanent state of political 
instability of the country often discourages potential investors. The chances for a successful 
implementation of an effective decentralization policy rely on substantial changes in all aspects of 
the social, political, and economic life of the country. Fortunately, the relative stability of the past 
five years and the progress made in terms of governance offer good hope that the overall 
environment might be improving.  
The Impact of the Earthquake 
Local and foreign investors are still reluctant to invest in Haiti because of the constant 
political turmoil of past 2–3 decades. However, a large majority of violent events usually occur in 
MAPAP; the rest of the country remains safe. Thus, the strongest poles and the regional capitals 
are a safe and secure alternative to MAPAP. In addition, there has been an overall improvement 
in security in Haiti. As former U.S. President Bill Clinton, currently the special envoy of the 
United Nations to Haiti, recently stated, “It is time to invest in Haiti” (Lacey 2009). This new 
hope should be channeled to address the problems caused by the primacy of MAPAP. 
Unfortunately, all the new hope changed with the January 12, 2010, earthquake.  
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In addition, the earthquake shone a brighter light on most of the issues raised by the 
present research and makes its policy relevance even more important. Today, the Haitian 
government is working with its national and international partners to prepare the Post Disaster 
Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework (PDNA) and the NSDP. In his speech on February 
18, 2010, the Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Planning, acknowledges most of the 
issues raised by this study and put under a magnifying glass by the earthquake. Followed are two 
excerpts from the speech that clearly demonstrates that decentralization, deconcentration of 
socioeconomic activities, and territorial balance are important concerns of the Haitian 
government.   
“We share a dream: the one to see Haiti as an emerging country by 2030, a simple and 
equal society, just and united, living in harmony with its environment, its culture and a controlled 
modernity where freedom of association and expression et land management are established, with 
of a modern, strong, dynamic, competitive, open economy, and with large territorial basis where 
the basic needs to the population are met and manage by a strong government, united and 
protective of the general interests, strongly deconcentrated and decentralized." 
“Our efforts focus on finding the balance between population and territory. Demography 
is an important issue and the deployment of the population on the territory is an issue as well. 
That is why we need to talk about regional development poles, about access to health and 
education services all over the national territory, about deconcentrated government services, of 
roads networks allowing for the circulation of people and goods. The country and its regions 
should position themselves in a network open to international partners and to economic ties with 
the outside."  
In addition, according to an article published on the Voice of America website relating a 
joint news conference held by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Haitian President 
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Rene Preval at the State Department in Washington, DC on March 9, 2010, the Haitian president 
acknowledges the role that past government policies focusing on MAPAP to the detriment of the 
regions have played in favoring migration toward MAPAP, the lack of urban planning, poverty, 
and inadequate housing that contributed to the mass casualties of the earthquake. According to 
the Prime Minister, "To rebuild Port-au-Prince as it was before would be a major historical 
mistake.  And that is the message that I am trying to convey, not only to the Haitians, but also to 
my international partners."  
Now the questions are: 
- How will decentralization be implemented? 
- Will the government once again focus on national agricultural 
production and neglect the urban economy? What kind of economic 
relationships will the government try to implement with the 
international market? 
The answers to these questions will determine the chances of success of the 
decentralization process and the impact that the economic policies will have on the 
socioeconomic development of Haiti.  
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Appendix 1: Population data by department 
 
Department of Artibonite    
 
 
Department of the Centre 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Gonaïves 263,716 103,215 160,501 
Ennery 39,104 35,972 3,132 
Estère 33,860 20,814 13,046 
Gros Morne 118,163 96,956 21,207 
Terre Neuve 23,920 23,014 906 
Anse Rouge 32,271 23,404 8,867 
Saint Marc 199,637 109,255 90,382 
Verrettes 109,474 82,547 26,927 
La Chapelle 23,986 20,321 3,665 
Dessalines 138,451 120,227 18,224 
Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite 129,360 102,348 27,012 
Grande Saline 17,143 14,319 2,824 
Desdunes 27,266 8,296 18,970 
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye 114,175 92,717 21,458 
Marmelade 28,872 23,517 5,355 
Total 1,299,398 876,922 422,476 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Hinche 93,899 69,768 24,131 
Maïssade 45,869 36,466 9,403 
Thomonde 35,307 28,289 7,018 
Cerca Carvajal 18,102 14,584 3,518 
Mirebalais 76,194 64,363 11,831 
Saut d'Eau 30,499 27,209 3,290 
Boucan Carré 43,813 41,437 2,376 
Lascahobas 48,665 42,168 6,497 
Belladère 67,526 57,606 9,920 
Savanette 28,260 25,235 3,025 
Cerca la Source 44,129 39,299 4,830 
Thomassique 49,242 40,462 8,780 
Total 581,505 486,886 94,619 
  
Carline Noailles - Department of Planning and Urban Studies  – University of New Orleans – PhD Program in Urban 
Studies  - 137 - 
 
Department of Grande Anse 
  
 
 
Department of North 
COMMUNE Rural Population Urban population Total population 
Jérémie 70,060 33,829 103,889 
Abricots 28,418 978 29,396 
Bonbon 5,440 1,248 6,688 
Moron 21,602 2,653 24,255 
Chambellan 17,184 3,380 20,564 
Anse d'Hainault 17,983 10,142 28,125 
Dame Marie 21,653 8,357 30,010 
Les Irois 11,963 6,109 18,072 
Corail 21,215 3,245 24,460 
Roseaux 26,351 1,530 27,881 
Beaumont 10,908 4,349 15,257 
Pestel 33,992 788 34,780 
Miragoane 61,982 16,126 78,108 
Petite Rivière de Nippes 19,935 2,276 22,211 
Anse-à-Veau 50,199 2,233 52,432 
Baradères 33,236 3,322 36,558 
Petit Trou de Nippes 38,816 3,016 41,832 
L'Asile 31,216 1,194 32,410 
Total 522,153 104,775 626,928 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Cap-Haïtien 211,630 7,572 204,058 
Quartier Morin 21,100 18,958 2,142 
Limonade 42,530 32,731 9,799 
Acul du Nord 43,118 37,097 6,021 
Plaine du Nord 31,817 25,162 6,655 
Milot 24,673 19,851 4,822 
Grde Rivière du Nord 31,900 23,959 7,941 
Bahon 17,932 16,655 1,277 
St Raphaël 41,458 33,571 7,887 
Dondon 26,688 21,448 5,240 
Ranquitte 21,366 19,139 2,227 
Pignon 33,366 26,176 7,190 
La Victoire 8,129 5,650 2,479 
Borgne 51,612 46,356 5,256 
Port Margot 38,468 28,860 9,608 
Limbé 65,788 39,612 26,176 
Bas Limbé 16,118 12,113 4,005 
Plaisance 53,665 44,679 8,986 
Pilate 41,685 38,136 3,549 
Total 823,043 497,725 325,318 
  
Department of North East 
 
 
 
 
Department of Nord West 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Fort-Liberté 26,679 10,054 16,625 
Ferrier 11,410 5,871 5,539 
Perches 9,016 4,861 4,155 
Ouanaminthe 82,549 38,775 43,774 
Capotille 15,390 14,586 804 
Mont Organisé 16,562 13,608 2,954 
Trou du Nord 38,225 21,839 16,386 
Sainte Suzanne 22,242 20,743 1,499 
Terrier Rouge 23,474 8,376 15,098 
Caracol 6,051 4,030 2,021 
Vallières 18,620 16,091 2,529 
Carice 10,709 7,800 2,909 
Mombin Crochu 27,458 23,879 3,579 
Total 308,385 190,513 117,872 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Port-de-Paix 157,032 86,290 70,742 
La Tortue 28,499 27,104 1,395 
Bassin Bleu 46,458 42,371 4,087 
Chansolme 12,594 10,953 1,641 
Saint Louis du Nord 84,661 61,581 23,080 
Anse à Foleur 22,052 17,935 4,117 
Môle Saint Nicolas 24,787 22,366 2,421 
Baie de Henne 19,985 18,434 1,551 
Bombardopolis 26,392 24,368 2,024 
Jean Rabel 108,738 100,998 7,740 
Total  531,198 412,400 118,798 
  
Department of the South 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of South East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Les Cayes 132,406 77,130 55,276 
Torbeck 61,080 57,786 3,294 
Chantal 27,350 24,631 2,719 
Camp-Perrin 36,124 33,032 3,092 
Maniche 6,973 6,291 682 
Ile-à-Vache 12,341 12,341 0 
Port-Salut 29,987 28,527 1,460 
Saint Jean du Sud 20,539 19,821 718 
Arniquet 8,751 7,554 1,197 
Aquin 83,525 74,832 8,693 
Saint Louis du Sud 51,862 49,705 2,157 
Cavaillon 41,476 40,000 1,476 
Côteaux 16,987 12,660 4,327 
Port-à-Piment 15,040 9,743 5,297 
Roche-à-Bateau 14,719 12,520 2,199 
Chardonnières 20,126 14,932 5,194 
Les Anglais 23,840 17,886 5,954 
Tiburon 18,525 12,637 5,888 
Total 621,651 512,028 109,623 
COMMUNE Total Population Rural population Urban population 
Jacmel 142,969 112,786 30,183 
Marigot 57,311 52,256 5,055 
Cayes-Jacmel 30,968 28,521 2,447 
La Vallée 28,014 27,232 782 
Bainet 66,694 64,204 2,490 
Côtes de Fer 37,694 36,181 1,513 
Belle Anse 58,352 55,291 3,061 
Grand Gosier 13,067 11,394 1,673 
Thiotte 26,722 22,490 4,232 
Anse à Pitres 22,884 14,678 8,206 
Total 484675 425033 59642 
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Appendix 3: Migration data by department 
 
Artibonite 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Anse Rouge 8,867 749 
Desdunes 18,970 516 
Dessalines 18,224 321 
Ennery 3,132 248 
Estère 13,046 286 
Grande Saline 2,824 118 
Gros Morne 21,207 942 
La Chapelle 3,665 0 
Marmelade 5,355 142 
Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite 27,012 59 
Saint Marc 90,382 167 
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye 21,458 277 
Terre Neuve 906 898 
Verrettes 26,927 50 
                                              Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003 
 
Grande Anse 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Abricots 29,396 276 
Anse d'Hainault 28,125 31 
Anse-à-Veau 52,432 2 
Baradères 36,558 5 
Beaumont 15,257 144 
Bonbon 6,688 108 
Chambellan 20,564 178 
Corail 24,460 101 
Dame Marie 30,010 57 
L'Asile 32,410 0 
Les Irois 18,072 12 
Miragoane 78,108 1 
Moron 24,255 153 
Pestel 34,780 68 
Petit Trou de Nippes 41,832 0 
Petite Rivière de Nippes 22,211 0 
Roseaux 27,881 248 
                                               Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003 
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Centre 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Belladère 9,920 10 
Boucan Carré 2,376 3 
Cerca Carvajal 3,518 110 
Cerca la Source 4,830 56 
Lascahobas 6,497 10 
Maïssade 9,403 160 
Mirebalais 11,831 20 
Saut d'Eau 3,290 8 
Savanette 3,025 20 
Thomassique 8,780 88 
Thomonde 7,018 35 
                                               Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003 
 
 
North 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Acul du Nord 6021 1109 
Bahon 1277 0 
Bas Limbé 4005 295 
Borgne 5256 1375 
Dondon 5240 1316 
Grde Rivière du Nord 7941 1170 
La Victoire 2479 62 
Limbé 26176 1512 
Limonade 9799 1311 
Milot 4822 1167 
Pignon 7190 308 
Pilate 3549 756 
Plaine du Nord 6655 1650 
Plaisance 8986 608 
Port Margot 9608 1880 
Quartier Morin 2142 496 
Ranquitte 2227 227 
St Raphaël 7887 808 
 
  
                                               Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003 
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                                                 Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003 
 
North East 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Capotille 804 33 
Caracol 2,021 5 
Carice 2,909 5 
Ferrier 5,539 104 
Mombin Crochu 3,579 2 
Mont Organisé 2,954 2 
Ouanaminthe 43,774 125 
Perches 4,155 17 
Sainte Suzanne 1,499 17 
Terrier Rouge 15,098 325 
Trou du Nord 16,386 77 
Vallières 2,529 117 
North West 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Anse à Foleur 1,395 823 
Baie de Henne 4,087 9 
Bassin Bleu 1,641 371 
Bombardopolis 23,080 67 
Chansolme 4,117 358 
Jean Rabel 2,421 1576 
La Tortue 1,551 717 
Môle Saint Nicolas 2,024 145 
Saint Louis du Nord 7,740 932 
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South 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants 
Aquin 8,693 52 
Arniquet 1,197 122 
Camp-Perrin 3,092 137 
Cavaillon 1,476 73 
Chantal 2,719 235 
Chardonnières 5,194 310 
Côteaux 4,327 188 
Les Anglais 5,954 172 
Maniche 682 53 
Port-à-Piment 5,297 106 
Port-Salut 1,460 118 
Roche-à-BΓteau 2,199 98 
Saint Jean du Sud 718 215 
Saint Louis du Sud 2,157 99 
Tiburon 5,888 217 
Torbeck 3,294 647 
South East 
  
Cities Population Number of migrants     
Anse à Pitres 8,206 46 
Bainet 2,490 127 
Belle Anse 3,061 179 
Cayes-Jacmel 2,447 129 
Côtes de Fer 1,513 20 
Grand Gosier 1,673 8 
La Vallée 782 30 
Marigot 5,055 148 
Thiotte 4,232 23 
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Appendix 4: Distance and number of migrants by department 
 
Artibonite   
Cities 
Distance from the 
Dpt capital Number of migrants 
Anse Rouge 32.79 749 
Desdunes 20.2 516 
Dessalines 20.24 321 
Ennery 18.39 248 
Estère 15.16 286 
Grande Saline 33.47 118 
Gros Morne 18.45 942 
La Chapelle 59.29 0 
Marmelade 32.8 142 
Pte. Rivière de l'Artibonite 37.61 59 
Saint Marc 33.88 167 
Saint Michel de l'Attalaye 34.26 277 
Terre Neuve 17.76 898 
Verrettes 44.15 50 
                                                               Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003 
Grande Anse   
Cities 
Distance from the 
Dpt capital Number of migrants 
Abricots 16.54 276 
Anse d'Hainault 38.23 31 
Anse-à-Veau 113.31 2 
Baradères 93.37 5 
Beaumont 25.65 144 
Bonbon 11.59 108 
Chambellan 19.23 178 
Corail 20.59 101 
Dame Marie 30.03 57 
L'Asile 97.18 0 
Les Irois 46.71 12 
Miragoane 129.24 1 
Moron 14.31 153 
Pestel 30.32 68 
Petit Trou de Nippes 123.75 0 
Petite Rivière de Nippes 119.08 0 
Roseaux 10.29 248 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
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Centre   
Cities 
Distance from the Dpt 
capital Number of migrants 
Belladère 65.85 10 
Boucan Carré 39.53 3 
Cerca Carvajal 14.51 110 
Cerca la Source 24.83 56 
Lascahobas 48.74 10 
Maïssade 11.25 160 
Mirebalais 34.99 20 
Saut d'Eau 44.74 8 
Savanette 58.4 20 
Thomassique 14.51 88 
Thomonde 11.64 35 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
North   
Cities 
Distance from the 
Dpt capital Number of migrants 
Acul du Nord 10.65 1109 
Bahon 23.96 0 
Bas Limbé 19.28 295 
Borgne 33.79 1375 
Dondon 19.79 1316 
Grde Rivière du Nord 14.24 1170 
La Victoire 43.95 62 
Limbé 15.67 1512 
Limonade 9.15 1311 
Milot 11.48 1167 
Pignon 38.56 308 
Pilate 38.72 756 
Plaine du Nord 8.25 1650 
Plaisance 29.49 608 
Port Margot 21.41 1880 
Quartier Morin 5.94 496 
Ranquitte 29.23 227 
St Raphaël 27.19 808 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
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North East 
  
Cities 
Distance from the 
Dpt capital Number of migrants 
Capotille 21.82 33 
Caracol 20.68 5 
Carice 31.39 5 
Ferrier 5.33 104 
Mombin Crochu 37.77 2 
Mont Organisé 26.31 2 
Ouanaminthe 13.1 125 
Perches 15.98 17 
Sainte Suzanne 21.71 17 
Terrier Rouge 11.05 325 
Trou du Nord 15.18 77 
Vallières 22.42 117 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
 
North West 
  
Cities 
Distance from the 
Dpt capital Number of migrants 
Anse à Foleur 16.71 823 
Baie de Henne 67.74 9 
Bassin Bleu 15.52 371 
Bombardopolis 54.24 67 
Chansolme 5.33 358 
Jean Rabel 27.2 1576 
La Tortue 10 717 
Môle Saint Nicolas 44.24 145 
Saint Louis du Nord 8.04 932 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
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South   
Cities Distance Number of migrants 
Aquin 33.39 52 
Arniquet 9.89 122 
Camp-Perrin 14.91 137 
Cavaillon 12.1 73 
Chantal 12.9 235 
Chardonnières 41.52 310 
Côteaux 30.88 188 
Les Anglais 46.49 172 
Maniche 12.76 53 
Port-à-Piment 36.35 106 
Port-Salut 16.33 118 
Roche-à-BΓteau 27.65 98 
Saint Jean du Sud 14.1 215 
Saint Louis du Sud 20.99 99 
Tiburon 61.31 217 
Torbeck 5.37 647 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South East   
Cities 
Distance from the 
Dpt capital Number of migrants     
Anse à Pitres 92.91 46 
Bainet 18.75 127 
Belle Anse 48.82 179 
Cayes-Jacmel 9.46 129 
Côtes de Fer 39.56 20 
Grand Gosier 66.15 8 
La Vallée 12.72 30 
Marigot 14.91 148 
Thiotte 69.31 23 
Source: IHSI, RGPH 2003   
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